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AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS IN THE UNITED




M AN WAS BORN TO FLY. But once he learned to fly,
man had to learn to cope with the problem of occasion-
ally crashing. The development of aviation product liability
law, particularly in the United States, has provided a legal
context for coping with this problem. To better understand
the legal context in which aircraft crashes should be viewed,
an examination of accidents at a technological level and at a
statistical level is necessary.
On a technological level, aircraft gradually have become
more sophisticated and more "airworthy" as aerodynamic
construction, new materials, modern avionics, and more pow-
erful engines have permitted aircraft to fly faster, higher, and
farther. Technological progress in making aircraft more
"crashworthy," however, has not been so impressive. In many
instances, the deficiency in crashworthiness has compounded
the consequences of many aircraft accidents.
On a statistical level, a positive development has been the
gradual decrease in the overall accident rate in general avia-
tion (as measured by each 100,000 hours flown)1 as well as in
commercial aviation (as measured by either passenger miles
*John Saba, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M., (all degrees received at McGill University).
Mr. Saba is currently a professor of law and political economy at Champlain College
in St. Lambert, Quebec (Canada).
Tye, Civil Aviation Safety, AIRCRAFT ENG'G. Sept. 1980, at 2.
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flown or number of flights).2 This decrease in the overall acci-
dent rate has occurred despite rapid growth in the number of
aircraft. This improvement should be understood in the con-
text of two factors.
First, general aviation aircraft accidents cause approxi-
mately eight times more fatalities than automobile accidents
and fifty times more deaths than commercial transport air-
craft crashes, as measured by deaths per passenger mile." Fur-
thermore, on the basis that during the past decade more than
100,000 general aviation aircraft occupants were involved in
39,458 accidents, some studies have predicted that a 60 per-
cent chance exists that a general aircraft currently in produc-
tion eventually will be involved in an accident. 5 This percent-
age assumes a 20-year life expectancy for the aircraft.'
Second, studies have shown that most crashes occur during
the take-off, approach, and landing phases of the flight.7 Dur-
ing these phases, aircraft are travelling at a relatively low alti-
tude and a slow speed. In a majority of these crashes, huge
sections of the fuselage and most occupants' bodies remain in-
tact.' Thus, the timing of these accidents raises the question
of whether the occupants could have survived these crashes if
the aircraft had been more crashworthy.
On the legal level, principles and theories gradually have
been developed and refined to accomodate the growth in liti-
gation of aircraft crash claims. In the early years of interna-
tional air service, the plaintiffs' bar was frustrated by the re-
gime of fixed and limited liability protecting the air carriers
under the Warsaw Convention of 1929.9 Plaintiffs' attorneys,
D. THURSTON, DESIGN FOR SAFETY 12 (1980).
"General aviation aircraft" are defined as "those airplanes certificated under 14
C.F.R. § 23 [sic] and predecessor regulations, having a gross weight of 12,500 pounds
or less." National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Report: The Status of Gen-
eral Aviation Aircraft Crashworthiness 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Report].
Schaden, Aircraft Crashworthiness, Trial, Jan. 1978, at 40, 41.
1980 Report supra note 3, at 1.
6 1980 Report, supra note 3, at 1.
7 Analysis of World Jet Aircraft Accidents By Phase of Flight: 1962-1977, British
Airways Air Safety Review, March 1978, at 3.
P. EDDY, E. POTTER, & B. PAGE, DESTINATION DISASTER 8 (1976).
For a comprehensive examination of the Warsaw Convention and the amending
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in their tireless search for the highest damages available to
aircraft crash victims, increasingly directed their suits at the
airframe and component manufacturers. 10 The liability of air-
craft manufacturers was and continues to be open-ended.
United States courts, with the sophisticated foundation of
existing common law principles of general product liability
law, assumed leadership in the development of aviation prod-
uct liability law. Initially, courts only would impose liability
on airframe and component manufacturers for deaths and in-
juries arising from a crash caused by defects in the manufac-
ture and the design of the aircraft. Recently, however, some
American courts have been willing to extend principles devel-
oped in automobile accident litigation to the aviation field,
thereby imposing liability on aircraft manufacturers for de-
fects that enhance or exacerbate the injuries or deaths of
crash victims."
This paper focuses on the airframe and components manu-
facturers' tort liability for deficient aircraft crashworthiness.
In the opinion of this author, the manufacturers' tort liability
is linked so intimately to a complicated matrix of technical
factors and legal issues that some reform of the present pro-
cess of court adjudication of crashworthiness cases is required.
In line with this reasoning, this paper is divided into four
parts: (1) a definition of key concepts; (2) an examination of
certain technical factors affecting aircraft crashworthiness; (3)
a review and an analysis of the origins and the development of
legal concepts and doctrines governing the manufacturers' tort
liability for aircraft crashworthiness; and (4) some recommen-
dations to remedy certain deficiencies in the present system of
litigation of aircraft crashworthiness claims.
protocols and agreements, see C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 337-72 (4th
ed. 1977).
'o See L. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law, ch. 7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Krei-
ndler] for an extensive examination of litigation involving the liability of aircraft
manufacturers.
" See infra notes 119-60 and accompanying text.
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II. DEFINING CRASHWORTHINESS AND "DESIGN" DEFECT
A. Crashworthiness
Crashworthiness may be defined in many different ways.
On a general level, crashworthiness refers to the degree an air-
craft is "fit to crash." On a legal level, crashworthiness pri-
marily focuses on the capacity of the vehicle to protect its oc-
cupants from enhanced or aggravated injuries or death in a
survivable crash.13 For example, the legal community would
be concerned with whether the vehicle could protect the pas-
sengers during the "second collision," when the passengers'
bodies collide with the interior of the vehicle. 4
B. Design Defects
Deficient crashworthiness is usually the consequence of a
defect in design.' 5 Design defects arise when the product
11 In this paper, for the purpose of consistency, the term "crashworthiness" is uti-
lized. Other concepts that are sometimes used to refer to the same phenomenon and
its consequences include "second accident" or "second impact" (respecting the pas-
sengers' bodies colliding with the interior of the vehicle) and "enhanced" or "post
crash" injuries (respecting the injuries resulting from not only the second collision
but also the environment created by the crash).
'3 Donnelly, Aircraft Crashworthiness-Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 42 J. AIR L. & CoM.
57-59 (1976).
" Galerstein, A Review of Crashworthiness, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 187, 196 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Galerstein].
11 It is important to distinguish "design" defects from "marketing" and "manufac-
turing" defects. Marketing defects arise when the product emerges from the manufac-
turing process without manufacturing and design defects. Nevertheless, the product
is marketed with inadequate warnings or instructions respecting possible risks in-
volved in the use of the product and how to minimize the harmful consequences from
such risks. Manufacturing defects arise when the product emerges from the manufac-
turing process in a condition not intended by the manufacturer. The product is not
constructed or assembled according to the manufacturer's design and production
standards, being different from other products coming off the same production line.
See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 33-
34 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Keeton I.]. See also Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 559, 562 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Keeton II.]. From a tactical perspective
an attorney should allege both a manufacturing and a design defect when it is possi-
ble that one of these has caused or contributed to a death or injury. This is the pre-
ferred approach because in practice an inherent difficulty exists in distinguishing
these two types of defects. Often an interdependency occurs between a design defect
and a manufacturing defect such that the design of a product affects quality control
and thus manufacturing defects. As a result, a change in design may reduce or elimi-
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emerges from the manufacturing process in a condition in-
tended by the manufacturer. The product is constructed or
assembled according to the manufacturer's design and pro-
duction standards, being identical with other products coming
off the same production line. The entire product line, how-
ever, is "defective" because all products were improperly
designed.' 6 Several types of design defects exist. These defects
include concealed dangers, missing features, and a lack of
crashworthiness. 7
III. TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS
Commentators, courts, and lawyers considering aircraft
crashworthiness issues often fail to attach sufficient signifi-
cance to the real constraints and trade-offs imposed by tech-
nological design factors. Technical design factors may affect
the number of deaths and the severity of injuries in a crash.
To help interested persons understand some of these
problems, this paper examines five basic technological design
factors including airframe crashworthiness/cabin integrity, re-
straint systems, cabin and cockpit environment, energy ab-
sorption, and post-crash hazards."8 The first four factors re-
late to the "dynamic" phase of the actual occurrence and
development of the crash and the impact. The last factor,
post-crash hazards, is associated with the "static" phase which
nate manufacturing defects. Abramson, Defining the Design Defect in Aircraft Prod-
ucts Liability Cases, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 167, 173 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Abram-
son]. It should be noted that for the purpose of theoretical consistency, this paper
handles deficient crashworthiness as a problem of design defect.
1 See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1543-44 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Henderson]. The finding by a court of a design defect generally results in
substantially higher costs for a manufacturer than a finding of a market or a manu-
facturing defect. See Comment, Strict Products Liability: Giving Content to the
Term "Defect" in Design Cases, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 213 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Comment]. In such a case, the manufacturer faces not only lawsuits seeking a remedy
for injuries and/or deaths but also the financial hardship of recalling or terminating
the production of the product.
"7 See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 138-78 (1981) for
an excellent survey of the scope of design defects.
'9 MOTT, Crashworthiness and Postcrash Hazards from the Airline Flight Attend-
ant's Point of View," in AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS 627 (K. Saczalski ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Mott].
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involves the emergency evacuation of the aircraft by the survi-
vors of the accident. 9
A. Airframe Crashworthiness/Cabin Integrity
Airframe designers understand that the first step in reduc-
ing injuries and deaths during an aircraft crash is to insure
that the aircraft cabin stays intact. The aircraft cabin should
maintain a "protective shell" around the occupants during
and after impact. This "protective shell" prevents the occu-
pants from being thrown from the aircraft or from being
crushed. 0
Today, most airframe structures, despite the gradual im-
provement in their design, cannot adequately withstand crash
forces and protect their occupants. While the human body can
withstand 40 "g" forces 21 in the forward direction without
broken bones or internal injuries, many aircraft are designed
to tolerate substantially less deceleration with minimal struc-
tural damage. For example, most general aviation aircraft can
withstand only about 20 "g" forces(" g's"9).22'
Although designers have created many aircraft with rela-
tively low deceleration tolerances of "g" forces, contemporary
design technology permits the construction of significantly
more crashworthy vehicles. For example, airframe designers
have known for some time that harder metals in the nose
structure would minimize the collapsing of the fuselage2" and
would reduce the digging in of the nose, 4 thereby increasing
the occupants' chances of surviving a crash. More ductile met-
als used elsewhere in the aircraft 25 also have been known to
improve crashworthiness. Therefore, much of the deficiency in
*' See W. JOHNSON & A. MAMALIS, CRASHWORTHINESS OF VEHICLES 90 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Johnson].
11 THOMPSON & CLARK, General Aviation Crashworthiness in AIRCRAFT CRASH-
WORTHINESS 45 (K. Saczalski ed. 1975)
" The letter -g" represents the gravitational attraction upon objects at sea level
(32.2ft/Sec.2). For more information on this concept and its application to general
aviation aircraft in crash circumstances see 1980 Report, supra note 3, at 5.
22 Schaden, supra note 4, at 42.
23 J. GODSON, UNSAFE AT ANY HEIGHT 185 (1970) [ hereinafter cited as Godson].
24 Johnson, supra note 19, at 87-88.
" Godson, supra note 23, at 186.
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crashworthiness of recently constructed airframes primarily
may be attributed to designers' decisions based on factors
such as cost, weight, and performance. This deficiency does
not arise from a lack of technology.
B. Restraint Systems
A second technological design factor that may reduce inju-
ries and deaths in an aircraft crash is the installation of ade-
quate restraint systems that "prevent an occupant, cargo, or
equipment from becoming a missile during a crash se-
quence.''2 Although technology generally exists today to pro-
vide adequate restraint systems, problems persist in regard to
seats, seat belts, cabin furnishings, and debris28 7 which break
loose from the cabin at relatively low impact levels. These
problems can transform potentially survivable crashes into in-
jurious and/or fatal crashes. Injuries and deaths largely con-
tinue because of inadequate minimum airworthiness and
crashworthiness standards.
The problem of flying objects exists on two levels. First,
tangible items within the cabin tend to be restrained in an
inadequate manner. Galleys or overhead storage bins may
spill their contents during an aircraft crash. These contents
include carry-on baggage, meal trays, and emergency equip-
ment. Consequently, these flying objects may cause death or
serious injuries by striking the passengers. Furthermore, these
objects may block the aisles during evacuation. The problem
of flying objects might be remedied through higher
crashworthiness standards that often require relatively inex-
pensive and simple changes. For example, in the case of carry-
on baggage, aircraft manufacturers might be required to pro-
vide some restraining device to secure the baggage under the
seat. 8
Second, a problem exists in both the anchoring and the na-
ture of seats and seatbelts. Seats and seatbelts tend to be in-
"' Johnson supra note 19, at 90.
27 "Debris" includes carry-on baggage, meal trays, and emergency equipment that
may break loose on impact.
,1 Mott, supra note 18, at 646.
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adequately attached to the cabin structure. Thus, in crashes
involving even moderate deceleration, the seats and seatbelts
often tear away from their anchoring,29 thereby exposing the
aircraft occupants to increased danger of injury and death. A
primary cause of seats and seatbelts tearing away is the inade-
quate minimum crashworthy design standards for seat and
seatbelt anchorings established by Federal Aviation Regula-
tions (FARs). Present regulations only require that aircraft
seatbelts be designed to withstand 9 "g's,''s somewhat less
than 1,500 pounds of holding strength for the average 170
pound occupant. The inadequacy of the FARs is obvious when
the FARs are compared to the more stringent requirements of
other regulatory bodies: the United States Air Force minimum
standard is 17 "g's" for its aircraft; the United States Navy
standard is 40"g's" for its aircraft; and the United States De-
partment of Transportation requires a much higher standard
of 29 "g's" for automobile seatbelts.3 '
Even if the seatbelts are ideally anchored, it is clear that
the single-lap belt required for passengers provides only mar-
ginal protection, merely restraining a passenger's pelvis. The
protection for the upper torso is inadequate. The head, trunk,
and appendages are free to flail about in a disintegrating
cabin, striking or being struck by objects which penetrate or
crush them. Studies show that many crash fatalities are
caused by head impact injuries, many of which could have
been prevented if lap-and-shoulder belts had been installed
and used.32
Ironically, the standard of crashworthiness for automobiles
is higher than the standard for aircraft. Automobiles are re-
quired to have lap-and-shoulder belts in the front seat for
both the driver and the passenger3 3 Present FARs do not re-
" 1980 Report, supra note 3, at 5.
0 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.561, 23.785 (1982). A more detailed discussion of crashworthy
design standards will occur later in this paper.
3' Schaden, supra note 4, at 43.
31 1980 Report, supra note 3, at 2. For example, in the case of general aviation
accidents, seventy percent of these accidents result in head injuries; one quarter may
be avoidable by using "lap-and-shoulder belts."
3- 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1981).
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quire that lap-and-shoulder belts be provided for aircraft pas-
sengers. Lap-and-shoulder belts only need to be installed in
the piloting crew's seats in commercial aviation aircraft and in
the front seats of general aviation aircraft4.3 Numerous studies
have recommended, however, that the ideal restraint for both
crew and passengers is a dual strap shoulder harness rather
than the single diagonal strap generally in use today.3 5 More
stringent government standards requiring such improved re-
straint systems would involve minimal financial costs in com-
parison to potential safety benefits.
C. The Cabin and Cockpit Environment
A third technological design factor affecting the number
and the extent of injuries and/or deaths in an aircraft crash is
the injurious or non-injurious nature of the cabin and cockpit
interior environments. Projections, barriers, and loose or bro-
ken away objects in the immediate vicinity of the occupant
continue to cause injuries or death.36 More specifically, head
impact usually occurs when the occupant "jackknifes over the
seatbelt and contacts hard, sharp, unyielding, rigid struc-
tures. ' 37 Severe injuries and deaths also occur in the cabin on
crash impact as the occupants' bodies hit the seats in front of
them and protuberances and sharp corners such as those of
the armrests and ashtrays. The lethal potential of the cockpit
environment occurs when the head and flailing appendages
contact hard and non-yielding control columns, rudders, and
instrument panels.38
Deaths and serious injuries caused by body impact with
projections and hard surfaces persist even though technology
since the 1950's makes it possible to significantly delethalize
both the cockpit and the cabin environments. Smoother sur-
faces, protective padding, and safety conscious designs would
- 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.33, 91 .39 (1982). See the discussion of present FARS governing
seatbelt installation and use in 1980 Report, supra note 3, at 15-16.
s D. THURSTON, DESIGN FOR SAFETY 88 (1980).
'6 Johnson supra note 19, at 90.
37 See 1980 Report, supra note 3, at 6. This report cites a 1977 study by R. G.
Snyder on civil aircraft restraint systems.
38 Id. at 6. Again, the Snyder study is cited.
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reduce and minimize possible injuries and deaths. For exam-
ple, pilot control yokes could be installed without horns and
the instrument panels could be made not only with softer
metal and padded surfaces but also with energy absorbing
characteristics such as shock mounts for the panel.3 9
D. Energy Absorption
A fourth crashworthiness factor is energy absorption, de-
fined as the ability of the airframe structure, restraint sys-
tems, and cabin environment to absorb crash forces by pro-
gressively yielding or deforming so as to cushion and to
distribute impact forces.40 Energy absorption is clearly an ele-
ment of the three factors previously examined. As discussed
earlier in the paper, deaths and injuries in crashes might be
reduced if aircraft were designed with energy-absorbing char-
acteristics such as the following: an airframe with a rigid nose
structure and a fuselage consisting of ductile metals; shock
absorbing seats; and smoother surfaces, more padding, and
softer metals in the cabin and cockpit environments.
E. Post-crash Hazards
The final crashworthiness factor involves those features of
the aircraft designed to facilitate or to impede a surviving oc-
cupant's ability to escape the aircraft safely during the
"static" emergency evacuation phase of the crash.41 The na-
'9 See Thompson, supra note 20, at 47.
:0 Mott, supra note 18, at 627.
1 See C. SNOW, J. CARROLL & M. ALLGOOD, SURVIVAL IN EMERGENCY ESCAPE FROM
PASSENGER AIRCRAFT FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, 55 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
SNOW]. The evacuation occurs in the context of the following sequence of
circumstances:
1. The events leading to the accident;
2. The impact profile, including secondary, tertiary and additional im-
pacts, plus twisting and other angular positive and negative
accelerations;
3. The immediate post-impact period, which may be complicated by
smoke, fire, panic, submersion, waveactions and other factors;
4. The later period, which may be characterized by exposure to ele-
ments, rough water, and lack of appropriate survival gear.
S. MOHLER, J. SWEARINGEN, E. MCFADDEN & J. GARNER, HUMAN FACTORS IN EMER-
GENCY EVACUATION, FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, 55 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
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ture and duration of the emergency evacuation may be af-
fected by a number of post-crash hazards. Some of these post-
crash factors are largely outside the scope of control and lia-
bility of the aircraft manufacturers and/or the carrier. Such
factors include the passengers' behavior, the exterior environ-
ment, the weather, and the time of day or night of the crash.4 2
Certain post-crash factors, however, are significantly within
the scope of control and liability of the manufacturers and/or
the carrier. These factors include distortion and damage to
the cabin,48 the crew's behavior which is conditioned by its
training and experience," configurational features, emergency
lighting and equipment, fire, smoke, and toxic gases. Two of
these factors will be discussed in more detail.4
1. Configurational Features
Configurational features that control access to exits and
evacuation flow rates greatly influence the possibility of a pas-
senger's survival during emergency evacuations." Seating den-
sity and seating location as well as aisle, width are the prod-
Mohler].
42 See Snow, supra note 41, at 1.
11 See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
4' The crew's behavior is not a matter within the manufacturer's control.
45 In addition to the two factors discussed in greater detail in the text, problems
surrounding such factors as emergency lighting and emergency equipment should also
be considered. Emergency lighting that fails can be a significant post-crash hazard.
Indeed, if the crash occurs at night or the cabin is overwhelmed by fire and/or smoke,
the occupants may find it virtually impossible to locate the emergency exits. Emer-
gency equipment, including life preservers and fire and oxygen equipment, may be
inadequate as to their location and/or their nature as well as not having clear instruc-
tions as to their use, thereby creating an unnecessary post-crash hazard.
46 "In aircraft accidents in which decelerative forces do not result in massive cabin
destruction and overwhelming trauma to passengers, survival is determined largely by
the ability of the uninjured passenger to make his way from a seat to an exit" and
then out of the aircraft "within time limits imposed by the thermo-toxic environ-
ment." Snow, supra note 41, at 55. Total abandonment of the aircraft is the ultimate
goal of an emergency evacuation. It has been demonstrated that in good emergency
evacuation conditions, a commercial jet aircraft can be evacuated with an average
individual time of slightly above one second. This evacuation time is slightly more
than one-half the average individual time required for the emergency evacuation of a
piston aircraft. Mohler, supra note 41, at 13-14. Furthermore, insofar as each actual
emergency evacuation is a unique incident full of unexpected events, the actual evac-
uation time varies from case-to-case.
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ucts of a compromise that aircraft and seat manufacturers
must make. The compromise involves airline operators' eco-
nomic pressures seeking more seats, less weight, and more
comfort, and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's)
desire for more crashworthiness safety in the form of stronger
seats and more space for adequate emergency evacuation."
The tragic irony is that cost pressures too often prevail, with
aircraft designers making a trade-off which may doom many
passengers and crewmembers in a future crash.
The first configurational factor, the location and density of
seats, is particularly a problem in cost-effective aircraft. Nu-
merous seats are often crowded onto the aircraft such that in-
adequate space exists in the aisles and around the emergency
exits for rapid and safe evacuation. Although the inadequate
space may prevent safe evacuation, the space between seats
may satisfy FARs. For example, Hasbrook's " investigation of
the July 11, 1961, Denver, Colorado, jet aircraft crash sug-
gested that some of the deaths were partly attributable to the
narrow (15.5 inches) aisles between the rows of triple seats.
The narrow aisles made it virtually impossible for attendants
in the tourist section to go forward and to accelerate the pas-
sengers toward the rear exit."' Furthermore, the danger always
exists that inadequately anchored seats may break loose from
the floor on crash impact and pile up in front of the emer-
gency exits, preventing people from escaping the aircraft. 0
The size, number, location, and operation of emergency ex-
its and escape slides is another set of configurational factors
that may pose post-crash hazards. The evacuation process
may be complicated by emergency exits that are too small, in-
sufficient in number, and not easily accessible. The opening of
emergency doors and hatches and the employment of escape
slides may be hampered by complicated procedures and inad-
17 Safety and Comfort: The Airliner Cabin, 117 FLIGHT INT'L 479 (1980).
40 A. H. Hasbrook is an aircraft crashworthiness expert who has reported on the
problem in a number of studies. See 1980 Report supra, note 3, at 34, for a small
bibliography of some of Hasbrook's reports.
49 Gonzales, Airline Safety: A Special Report, PLAYBOY, July 1980 at 222 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Gonzales]. Gonzales also cites a 1962 Hasbrook study.
" Bruce v. Martin-Mariette Corp., 544 F.2d 442-44 (10th Cir. 1976).
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equate instructions. Furthermore, despite earnest efforts by
manufacturers to remedy the problem, the crash impact gen-
erally results in a torqued fuselage causing emergency exit
doors and hatches to jam and become inoperable.5'
F. Post-crash Fire, Smoke, and Toxic Gases
Studies of many aircraft accidents show that a post-crash
fire is highly likely after a crash, and that once ignition occurs
in the presence of large quantities of uncontained fuel, the fire
will burn intensely and spread rapidly. The post-crash fire,
therefore, significantly reduces the chances for the occupants
to survive and to escape." For example, one FAA study esti-
mates that in a survivable turbine-powered aircraft accident,
"not only do 95 percent of fatalities occur when a post-crash
fire is involved," but also fire, smoke, and gas hazards are re-
sponsible for 40 percent of such fatalities. 3
The first aspect of the post-crash hazard involves the
probability of a post-crash fire occurring. If after the crash no
fire breaks out, or a fire breaks out that is restricted and re-
tarded by various means, an occupant's ability to survive and
thereby to escape improves. The post-crash fire hazard is af-
fected by factors such as the nature and location of the fuel
tank and the fire extinguishing system. While various crash-
worthy fuel systems that reduce both fuel spillage and igni-
tion of spilled fuel have been researched, developed, and
tested,'4 aircraft manufacturers generally are reluctant to in-
corporate such systems into aircraft because of the high costs.
The second aspect of the post-crash hazard involves the
emission of excessive heat, smoke, and toxic gases from flam-
' Godson, supra note 23, at 101. A 1969 Flight Safety Foundation study of twenty-
six accidents in the 1957-67 period revealed that only about one-quarter of the emer-
gency exits were used in post-crash emergency evacuation circumstances because
most of the other exits were jammed. This study is cited in Gonzales, supra note 49,
at 220-22.
&2 Robertson & Adamczyk, "Crashworthy Fuel Systems," in Aircraft Crashworthi-
ness 670, 669-82 (K. Saczalski ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
Bulloch, Survivability in Aircraft Fires: New Standards are Needed, 34 Inter-
avia 557 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bulloch].
Robertson, supra note 52, at 678-79. This article cites the research and develop-
ment of crashworthy fuel systems sponsored by the United States Army.
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mable cabin furnishings and materials. Flammable cabin fur-
nishings include the wall lining, ceiling and flooring materials,
partitions, galley, toilet fittings, seats, and carpets.5 5 Flamma-
ble materials include windows and electrical wiring. 6 Al-
though aircraft manufacturers and the FAA have known for
many years of the hazardous nature of chemicals contained in
certain cabin materials such as polyurethane used in the seat
upholstery of most aircraft today and have known that the
state-of-the-art permits replacement of these chemicals, no
significant move has been made to eliminate their use. In fact,
the FAA has not promulgated a single rule on smoke and
toxic-gas emissions in over a decade. Thus, heat, smoke, and
poisonous gas related deaths continue to occur from otherwise
survivable accidents.5
This survey of the technological parameters of the aircraft
crashworthiness problem is not conceived as an indictment of
the airframe and components manufacturers. Manufacturers
must make tradeoffs in design. These tradeoffs are based on
considerations such as reducing costs, increasing performance
and reliability, and improving safety. Only with a realistic ap-
preciation of the complex technical problems faced by manu-
facturers can one comprehend the development of the law re-
specting a manufacturer's liability for aircraft
crashworthiness.
IV. LEGAL PARAMETERS OF AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS
Certain legal principles, standards, and issues have been de-
veloped to accommodate personal injury and death actions
based on claims of deficient aircraft crashworthiness.58 These
" Bullock, supra note 53, at 557.
"Id.
57 Id. at 558. An example of the continuing problem is the July 11, 1973 crash of a
Varigo Boeing 707 near Paris. Only one of the 117 passengers was rescued alive, most
found asphyxiated, still strapped in their seats. Id. at 557.
" Much of the discussion of the legal parameters of aircraft crashworthiness in-
volves a reorganization, modification, and regurgitation of material included in an-
other article written by this author, Saba, Aircraft Crashworthiness and the Manu-
facturer's Tort Liability in the United States, 7 Annals Air & Space L. 171, 177-208
(1982).
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principles, standards, and issues will be discussed in the fol-
lowing manner: (1) on an administrative level, the crash-
worthy design standards developed by the FAA; (2) on the ju-
dicial level, the origins, development, and present status of
airframe and component manufacturers' tort liability; and (3)
the advantages and disadvantages of litigating claims of defi-
cient aircraft crashworthiness. This examination is under-
taken with the goal of ultimately recommending certain
changes to improve upon the present system of litigating air-
craft crashworthiness cases.
A. Crashworthy Design Standards
Administratively, the aircraft manufacturer's liability is reg-
ulated by crashworthy design standards formulated by the
FAA. The FAA formulates these standards by exercising its
congressionally granted power of promulgating FARs.59 FARs
establishing minimum crashworthy design standards cover
such factors as restraint systems,60 the cabin interior,6" and
the emergency exits.2 Existing FARs are plagued by three key
problems.
First, the FARs establish "minimum" standards which are
often excessively low and inadequate. For example, as dis-
cussed earlier, although the average human can tolerate 40
"g's" of forward deceleration, the present FAR governing seat
belts only requires 9 "g's" tolerance.63 It should be reiterated
that other regulatory bodies such as the United States Air
Force and Navy have established superior and more stringent
requirements than contemporary FAA standards." Today, a
helicopter manufacturer who designs and certificates his heli-
copter to mandatory FAA crashworthiness standards holds a
significant commercial advantage over a manufacturer who
satisfies the much more stringent Air Force and Navy stan-
49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1976).
40 14 C.F.R. § 25.785 (1982) (governing seating, seat belts, and harnesses).
14 C.F.R. § 25.853 (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 25.805-.811 (1982) (governing emergency exits).
*s See 14 C.F.R. § 25.561 (1982).
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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dards. If the helicopter should crash, however, the commer-
cially advantaged manufacturer may find that the plaintiffs'
attorneys cite Air Force or Navy standards as proof of a de-
sign defect, even though the latter standards only involve vol-
untary compliance.
A second problem exists because the FARs are often too
vague, giving manufacturers insufficient guidance on crash-
worthy designs."' One such FAR states that the aircraft
"structure must be designed to give each occupant every rea-
sonable chance of escaping serious injury in a minor crash
landing"."6 Although this ambiguous language creates insuffi-
cient guidelines, some vagueness is necessary to give manufac-
turers enough flexibility to solve unanticipated problems.0
A third problem plaguing the FARs is that an aircraft man-
ufacturer's compliance with the FARs is not conclusive proof
of a safe aircraft because the FARs are only of a minimum
nature. When FARs are inferior to common law established
standards, courts may consider the safety of the product re-
gardless of whether the product complies with FARs.18 The
safety consideration is complicated by the fact that the courts
have not developed uniform design standards. This lack of
uniformity is due to the judiciary's failure to establish a single
objective definition and test for determining a design defect."
Thus, aircraft manufacturers suffer the uncertainty of not
knowing whether they are bound by the minimum
crashworthiness standards established in the FARs or the
higher crashworthiness standards established by the courts on
a case-by-case basis. 70
as Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft and the Manufacturer's Liability, 13 Akron
L. Rev. 553, 558 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft].
14 C.F.R. § 23.561(b) (1982).
67Marcy, The Crashworthiness Doctrine and the Allocation of Risks in Commer-
cial Aviation, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1581, 1605 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Marcy].
" This problem was suggested by Justice Linde in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
282 Or. 61, 57 P.2d 1322, 1334-35 (1978), reh'g denied, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287
(1978).
60 See infra notes 71-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts'
failure to develop a single objective test for design defect and uniform standards,
including many examples of this problem.
7' See infra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
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B. The Origins and Development of the Aircraft
Crashworthiness Doctrine7
1
The discussion of the origins and the development of the
aircraft crashworthiness doctrine will be subdivided as fol-
lows: (1) the roots and basic principles of negligence-based
products liability law; (2) the automobile crashworthiness doc-
trine; (3) the roots of the aircraft crashworthiness doctrine; (4)
the aircraft crashworthiness doctrine matures: strict liability
in tort; (5) the return to the negligence standard under the
proposed statutory alternative of the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act; and (6) the nature of the action that invokes the
crashworthiness doctrine.
1. The Roots and Basic Principles of Negligence-Based
Products Liability Law
Industrialization and the mass production of goods created
the need for an effective cause of action in tort for consumers
and users injured by defective products. For many decades,
consumers were confronted with a common law rule known as
the Winterbottom rule.72 The Winterbottom rule prevented
an injured plaintiff-consumer from bringing a negligence-
based products liability suit unless the plaintiff was in privity
of contract with the manufacturer.7 3 The shackles of contrac-
tual privity were significantly abandoned in the 1916 New
York Court of Appeals decision of MacPherson v. Buick Mo-
tor Co.74 In MacPherson, Justice Cardozo held an automobile
manufacturer liable to the ultimate purchaser of a vehicle for
injuries suffered by the purchaser's wife when one of the
wheels, made of defective wood, crumbled into fragments and
71 This paper focuses on the tort liability of the aircraft manufacturer but excludes
a discussion of the principles of express and implied warranty.
72 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
78 See W. PROSSER, THE LAW Or TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Prosser]. Some exceptions to the requirement of contractual privity were made. Nota-
bly, manufacturers were deemed liable to a third party for negligence in the sale of
"imminently" or "inherently" dangerous products. See, e.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6
N.Y. 397 (1852).
74 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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caused the vehicle to collapse. Justice Cardozo based the
manufacturer's liability on negligence rather than on contract.
Justice Cardozo was of the opinion that the manufacturer
owes a duty of care directly to the foreseeable purchasers and
users of the product.7
6
A products liability/negligence action requires that a plain-
tiff prove the following elements: (a) the defendant owed a
duty of care to the foreseeable plaintiff;77 (b) the defendant
breached his duty by negligently providing a "defective"
product; (c) the breach of duty was both the actual and proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's damages; and (d) the plaintiff
suffered damages. 78 The principles of negligence-based liabil-
ity have been extended to manufacturers who are responsible
not only for manufacturing and marketing defects but also for
design defects.7 9 This negligence in design liability was first
extended to manufacturers of airframes and component parts
in Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp.80
2. Automobile Crashworthiness Doctrine
The question of whether the nature and the scope of the
duty of care owed by manufacturers to consumers extends to
'6 Id. at 384-85, 111 N.E. at 1051.
76 Id. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053. Justice Cardozo stated as follows:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.
. . . If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used with-
out new tests, then irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this
thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. . . . We have put
aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and
nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought
to be. We have put its source in the law.
Id.
77 Foreseeable plaintiffs include users, consumers, and bystanders. Aircraft occu-
pants would also be considered foreseeable plaintiffs.
78 See 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability §25 (1972).
71 For definitions of these concepts, see supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
" 1 Av. CAS. 698 (CCH) (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1937). In Maynard, the plaintiff claimed
that the in-flight fire which destroyed his aircraft was caused by two design de-
fects-excessively short exhaust stacks and a carburetor drain opening too close to
the exhaust stacks. The court held the aircraft manufacturer liable for negligence in
design because its design created an unnecessary fire hazard. Id. at 699-700.
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designing crashworthy vehicles was first posed in automobile
crash circumstances. Today, a decreasing minority of jurisdic-
tions adhere to the restrictive view of the manufacturer's duty
announced in Evans v. General Motors Corp."1 The restrictive
view precludes crashworthiness suits based on negligent de-
sign. An increasing majority of jurisdictions, however, adhere
to the broader view of the manufacturer's duty established in
Larsen v. General Motors Corp.82 The broader view recog-
nizes an automobile crashworthiness doctrine and permits
suits based on negligent design.
a. The "Evans" approach
In Evans v. General Motors Corp., the plaintiff's decedent
was killed when his automobile was struck broad-side by an-
other vehicle.' The plaintiff sued General Motors alleging
that the death was proximately caused by the negligent design
of the decedent's automobile.' 4 The vehicle was designed with
an 'X' frame, a frame that did not have side-frame rails to
protect the driver in the event of a side impact collision." The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of the
defendant manufacturer by effectively rejecting any
crashworthiness doctrine of recovery.'6
The appellate court's decision in Evans was underpinned by
a narrow definition of the automobile manufacturer's duty.
According to the court, the manufacturer did not owe a duty
to consumers to design a crashworthy or accident-proof vehi-
81 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966). Decisions following the Evans approach include:
Schemel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp.,
264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss.
1969).
82 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). It should be noted that most decisions following
Larsen are federal court decisions predicting what the state courts would hold. Deci-
sions following the Larsen approach include: Bremier v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 340
F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972); Dyson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976); Mickle v. Blackman,
252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
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cle87 because the intended purpose or "use" of an automobile
is for driving and not for crashing."8 This restricted duty ex-
isted "despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possi-
bility that such collisions might occur."89 Furthermore, on a
policy level, the court recommended as a desirable goal the
formulation of stricter design standards that require manufac-
turers to construct crashworthy vehicles.9 The court stated,
however, that the establishment of such standards would be a
"legislative function" and not the consequence of "judicial in-
terpretation of existing law."9
Many commentaries criticizing Evans focused on two weak-
nesses in the court's reasoning.92 First, the majority of the
court failed to understand the truly basic issue in the
case-whether the manufacturer had a duty "to use such care
in designing its automobiles that reasonable protection is
given purchasers and users against death and injury from ac-
cidents which are expected and forseeable yet unavoidable de-
spite careful use."" Second, the Evans court largely based its
decision on the New York case of Campo v. Scofield94 which
was subsequently overruled.
b. The "Larsen" approach
In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 95 the plaintiff received
" Id. at 824.
" Id. at 825.
89 Id.
" Id. at 824.
91 Id.
9 See, e.g., Golden, Automobile Crashworthiness-The Judiciary Responds When
Manufacturers Improperly Design Their Cars, 46 INs. COUNS. J. 335, 341 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Golden].
359 F.2d at 827 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
' 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). The Campo Court was overruled in Micallef
v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976). In Campo, the court was con-
cerned with whether a manufacturer had a duty to design a machine with a safety
guard or stopping device to prevent injury to a user resulting from a patent defect.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision that the defendant
manufacturer owed no such duty since obvious dangers are excluded from the scope
of "intended use." 301 N.Y. at 469-72, 95 N.E.2d at 803-04. This decision is question-
able authority for deciding a manufacturer's liability for the frame design of an auto-
mobile. Golden, supra note 92, at 341.
95 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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serious injuries when the impact of a head-on collision caused
a severe thrust of the steering mechanism into the plaintiff's
head."6 The plaintiff sued General Motors alleging that his in-
juries and/or their exacerbation were proximately caused by
the negligent design of the steering shaft.97 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit held in favor of the plaintiff, 8
thereby establishing a precedent that introduced the doctrine
of crashworthiness into automobile crash litigation.
The court of appeals' decision in Larsen rejected the rea-
soning of Evans in two basic respects. First, the court posited
a broader definition of the automobile manufacturer's duty.
The court held that the manufacturer has a qualified duty to
design a relatively crashworthy vehicle, not a crashproof vehi-
cle, but one incorporating design factors minimizing or lessen-
ing the injurious effects of a crash.9 9 The Larsen court as-
sumed that "duty" included a broader interpretation of the
intended "purposes" or "use" of the vehicle than had the Ev-
ans court. The Larsen court was of the opinion that although
crashing is not an intended purpose of an automobile, crashes
are clearly foreseeable and a statistically unavoidable conse-
quence of the normal and intended use of an automobile for
which the manufacturer must design. 100 A second distinguish-
ing feature is that unlike the Evans approach that leaves the
formulation of crashworthiness standards to the legislature,
Larsen took the judicial activist position that courts have a
role in supplementing existing statutes and regulations in the
area of automobile crashworthiness. 101
One often-repeated criticism of Larsen is directed at the
court's logic which assumes that a manufacturer has a duty to
design crashworthy vehicles simply because automobile colli-
" Id. at 496-97.
" Id. at 497. The steering shaft of this automobile was not designed like that of
other cars to minimize the rearward displacement or impact. Indeed, in cases of
front-end collision the steering shaft would be pushed back toward the driver's head
just like a spear. Id. at 497 n.2.
o8 Id. at 502.
Id. at 502-03.
100 Id. at 502.
101 Id. at 506.
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sions are foreseeable by the manufacturer. One critic argued
that "[f]oreseeability ... is not to be equated with duty; it is
• ..but one factor, albeit an important one, to be weighed in
determining the issue of duty." 102 Despite the court's ques-
tionable assumption, an overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions adopted and continue to use the Larsen approach while
rejecting the Evans perspective. 08
3. The Roots of the Aircraft Crashworthiness Doctrine
Although the doctrine of crashworthiness has received wide-
spread acceptance in the field of automobile accident litiga-
tion, the doctrine only recently has been invoked successfully
in a small number of aviation accident cases. The lack of
knowledge possessed by courts respecting the crashworthiness
doctrine and the courts' failure to apply the doctrine in avia-
tion cases is due to two factors. First, many of the aviation
crashworthiness cases are not reported because the cases are
settled before they go to trial.'0 4 Second, crashworthiness
cases that are adjudicated generally do not proceed beyond
the trial court level, resulting in decisions that either are not
reported or if reported, are not easily accessible. 0 5
In the small number of litigated and reported aircraft
crashworthiness cases, courts divided between applying the
Evans and the Larsen approaches. The first school of thought
follows the Evans approach and rejects the adoption of the
crashworthiness doctrine in aviation accident litigation. This
view is best exemplified by decisions of courts located in Mis-
sissippi. Consistent with the application of the Evans logic in
automobile accident litigation,10 a Mississippi federal court in
'0" Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974).
103 This statement should be qualified by the fact that most decisions following
Larsen are federal court decisions. See supra note 82.
104 Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 65, at 558. A problem is that
most of the aircraft crashworthiness cases are never appealed. Thus, the cases do not
reach the widely reported and readily available level of supreme court and court of
appeal decisions.
105 d.
to Gen. Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971); Ford Motor Co. v.
Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568
(Miss. 1969).
AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS
Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,107 as well as the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court in Pattillo v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,08
refused to adopt the doctrine of aircraft crashworthiness.
In Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., an aircraft crashed
after its engine caught fire. 09 On impact, the pilot's seat col-
lapsed and the safety harness broke loose such that the pilot
was violently catapulted into the instrument panel and was
killed.1 0 The plaintiff's widow alleged that the negligently
designed and inadequately constructed restraint and energy-
absorption systems of the aircraft contributed to the dece-
dent's death."' The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi decided in favor of the defen-
dant manufacturer stating that Mississippi law imposed no
duty on the manufacturer to design a seat and a safety har-
ness that could withstand a high speed crash.1 2 The federal
court rejected the crashworthiness doctrine, considering itself
obligated to follow the precedent established by Mississippi
state courts. The holdings of the Mississippi state courts coin-
cided with Evans in regard to automobile accident cases."3
In 1980, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Pattillo v.
Cessna Aircraft Corp., reaffirmed its rejection of the
crashworthiness doctrine both in automobile and in aviation
accident litigation."" In Pattillo, pilot error caused an air-
plane to crash during dense fog and adverse weather condi-
tions.1 5 On impact, the decedent's passenger seat and seatbelt
tore loose such that the decedent was thrown into the yoke,
into the instrument panel, and then out of the aircraft." 6 The
plaintiffs alleged that the negligently designed and negligently
manufactured restraint system of the aircraft contributed to
107 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
306 379 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 1980).
09 376 F.Supp. at 605.
110 Id.
11 Id.
'~' Id. at 607.
"i Id. at 607-08. See supra note 106 for Mississippi State Court decisions rejecting
the crashworthiness doctrine.
114 379 So. 2d at 1227.
116 Id. at 1225.
116 Id.
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the decedent's death.1 7 The court, following the holding in
Evans, decided in favor of the defendant manufacturer re-
jecting the doctrine of crashworthiness. The Mississippi Su-
preme Court reiterated its position established in automobile
crashworthiness cases and cited for support the cases relied
upon by the federal court in Williams."'
A second school of thought, however, exists in respect to the
manufacturer's liability for the crashworthiness of aircraft.
This school follows the Larsen approach and accepts the doc-
trine of crashworthiness in aviation accident litigation. Deci-
sions, usually rendered at the trial court level, that pursued
the Larsen approach, based the manufacturer's liability on
principles of negligent design and/or breach of implied war-
ranty and/or strict liability. While these trial court decisions
do not add to or modify existing principles of law, their appli-
cation of the crashworthiness doctrine is demonstrative of the
growing acceptance of the doctrine in aviation accident litiga-
tion. The following cases exemplify the application of the
crashworthiness doctrine to general aviation accidents.
Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,11 decided in 1972, is proba-
bly the first decision to apply the crashworthiness doctrine to
an aviation crash. Smith involved a general aviation airplane
that crashed after attempting a take-off. After the initial im-
pact, little damage occurred to the aircraft and no injuries oc-
curred to the occupants.2 0 A post-crash fire, however, resulted
in three deaths and the injury of one passenger.' 2 ' The plain-
tiffs sued the aircraft manufacturer on the theories of negli-
gence, warranty, and strict liability. 122 Many of the plaintiffs'
"allegations invoked uncrashworthy features."'' 2 3 The plain-
tiffs were successful in their claims.1 2 4
17 Id.
IS Id. at 1226-27.
No. 70-9255-L (Dist. Ct. of Dallas County, 193d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 6,
1972), abstracted in 16 AM. TRiAL LAW. NEWSLETrER 30 (1973). This case is also cited
in Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 65, at 561 n.57.






In 1973, the California Superior Court decided Fuller v.
Capitol Sky Park.125 In Fuller, the plaintiff pilot negligently
caused the crash of his crop duster plane. On impact, the pi-
lot's seatbelt broke such that he was thrust out of the aircraft
and suffered permanent paraplegia. 26 The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer alleging that the seatbelt was defective. The
trial court found the manufacturer liable under the doctrine
of crashworthiness and held that the plaintiff's injuries were
exacerbated and proximately caused by the defective seatbelt
system.1 2
7
In Eichstedt v. Cessna Aircraft Co.'2e, an aircraft hit a can-
yon wall as a result of pilot error.'29 Mr. Eichstedt, a passen-
ger, survived the initial impact with his portion of the aircraft
cabin remaining largely intact. He crawled to safety but later
died from internal injuries that arose during the "dynamic"
phase of the crash. e30 The plaintiffs sued the aircraft manufac-
turer alleging that Eichstedt's death was caused by the im-
proper installation of seatbelts, the absence of a shoulder har-
ness, and the inadequately anchored seats."' (Eichstedt's seat
left its mark upon impact). 2 The "three alleged defects
presented crashworthiness issues and were pursued under the-
ories of negligence, warranty and strict liability.""' The jury
finding that design of the aircraft was uncrashworthy held for
the plaintiff. "
Other general aviation cases exist in which the issue of air-
craft crashworthiness was seriously considered by the court
even though the case was not decided on that basis. For exam-
,15 Fuller v. Capitol Sky Park, No. 203674 (Super. Ct., Sacramento Div. Feb. 1973),
(cited in comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 65, at 562 n.59 abstracted in
16 Am. Trial Law. Newsletter 331 (1973)).
126 Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 65, at 562.
17 Id.
128 Eichstedt v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 282029 (Dist. Ct. of Washoe County Nev.,
Aug. 1977) (cited in Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 65, at 562 n.60).
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ple, in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,136 the plaintiffs failed
to convince the court either that the crash of the aircraft was
caused by engine failure due to defective design or that the
passengers' deaths were caused by the inadequate
crashworthiness of the aircraft. The plaintiffs claimed that the
restraint system was deficient because no shoulder harnesses
were installed and the seatbelts and the attachments were
torn loose from the cabin on impact.' Although the court
held for the defendant, the court seriously considered evi-
dence respecting the crashworthiness issue. If more evidence
had been produced, the court might have decided in favor of
the plaintiff on the basis of deficient aircraft
crashworthiness. 87
The New York decision of Cousins v. Instrument Flyers,
Inc.,"8' directly involved the issue of crashworthiness. In
Cousins, the plaintiff was injured when the leased plane that
he was piloting ran out of fuel and crash-landed."" The plain-
tiff alleged that his injuries were contributed to and/or were
caused by the defective design of the aircraft."1 0 The plaintiff
claimed that the aircraft was uncrashworthy in the following
respects: (i) the restraint system of the aircraft was inade-
quate; (ii) the seat attachment was inadequate; (iii) a hazard-
ous cabin environment existed; and (iv) no energy absorption
device could be found in the front section of the aircraft. 14 1
The court held for the defendant manufacturer on the basis
that contributory negligence was a complete defense under
New York law to a strict products liability claim.14 2 Thus, be-
cause the plaintiff's claim was rejected on the basis of contrib-
utory negligence, the court never decided the issue of
crashworthiness. Nevertheless, an argument can be made that
absent a contributory negligence defense, the court might
IN 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, rehearing denied, 282 Or. 411, 179 P.2d 1287 (1978).
IN 577 P.2d at 1329.
See Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 65, at 561.
IN 58 A.D.2d 336, 396 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1977).
18 Id.




have decided in favor of the plaintiff because New York law
recognizes the "second impact" theory.'4
A more recent decision recognizing the applicability of the
aircraft crashworthiness doctrine is Trust Corp. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp. 144 In Trust Corp., pilot error caused an aircraft to
strike a telephone wire shortly after take-off. " The pilot died
in the subsequent crash.1" The plaintiff sued the aircraft
manufacturer for the death of the decedent alleging that the
pilot restraint system was defective. The plaintiff claimed that
the pilot's seat lacked shoulder harnesses that would have
prevented the pilot's fatal injury upon impact."
The district court did not decide the issue of liability. The
court stated, however, that under Montana law, comparative
liability principles applied in such "ground collision" products
liability actions.'14  Furthermore, the court stated that a
crashworthiness action "is viable even though the cause of the
accident was not the defective condition alleged to have en-
hanced the injuries.''
At this point it is appropriate to diverge from general avia-
tion accident litigation to introduce a case in which the manu-
facturer of a commercial aircraft was sued on the basis of the
crashworthiness doctrine. Although the plaintiffs did not suc-
ceed in Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,' 0 the fact that the
court diligently and systematically considered the
crashworthiness claim is a persuasive basis for expecting a
favorable acceptance of the crashworthiness doctrine in future
148 Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 65, at 560. See supra note 12
and accompanying text respecting the concept of "second impact."
'" 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
"' Id. at 1094.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1098. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike those defenses.
The motion asserted that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and, therefore, not
permitted to recover. The court added, however, that "conduct by the plaintiff which
could be termed contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse, shall in the
future be used, if applicable, only to compare fault and reduce damages, if any are
proved." Id. at 1099. See supra note 12 and the accompanying text respecting the
concept of "second collision."
"4 506 F. Supp. at 1094.
15 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'g, 418 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
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cases of commercial aircraft crashes.
In Bruce, a commercial aircraft crashed into a mountain."'
The accident resulted in the deaths of thirty-two of the forty
occupants." 2 While the crash itself was survivable, the impact
caused the seats in the passenger cabin to break loose from
the floor and to be thrown against the bulkhead of the
cabin." 3 Consequently, the seats being torn from the cabin
floor not only injured the passengers but also blocked the
exit."" Thus, when a post-crash fire erupted, emergency evac-
uation was thwarted by the blocked exit such that passengers
either perished or were seriously injured."' The plaintiffs, in-
jured passengers and relatives of deceased passengers, sued on
the basis of negligence, breach of express and implied war-
ranty, and strict liability," 6 claiming that the defendant man-
ufacturer"57 failed to design, manufacture, and/or maintain a
crashworthy aircraft in terms of both its restraint system"58
and its capacity to minimize the post-crash fire hazard." 9
The district court granted the defendant manufacturer's
1 Id. at 444.
16 Id.




18 The plaintiffs alleged that "the crash resulted from the defendants' negligence
in the design, manufacture, inspection, service, maintenance and equipping of the
aircraft; the crash was caused by defective engines; 'the defendants were negligent in
failing to equip and maintain [the] aircraft to include crashworthy design characteris-
tics; the seats and seat attachments did not minimize the possibility of failure by
forces acting on the seats during the crash. The aircraft did not incorporate design
and manufacturing techniques to minimize the possibility of fire in the event of a
crash; the crash constituted a breach of implied and express warranties by the defen-
dants that the aircraft was crashworthy, the injuries received were as a result of the
failure of the defendants to incorporate crashworthy features in the aircraft for
which, the defendants are strictly liable.'" Bruce v. Martin-Marietta, 418 F. Supp.
829, 830 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
M" Bruce, 544 F.2d at 444. The plaintiffs sued the aircraft manufacturer, Martin-
Marietta Corporation, and the air carrier, Ozark Airlines.
1" 418 F. Supp. at 830. The plaintiffs alleged that "the seats and seat attachments
did not minimize the possibility of failure by forces acting on the seat during the
crash." See supra note 156 for the text of the essential elements of the complaint.
1SO 418 F. Supp. at 836. See supra note 156 for the the essential elements of the
complaints.
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motion for summary judgment.'10 The court's decision was
based on the plaintiffs' failure to prove a defect in design. The
court was of the opinion that the disputed features of the air-
craft satisfied all the minimum standards of engineering de-
sign requirements and federal regulations.16
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision."' The appellate court, however, was
particularly concerned with establishing the manufacturer's li-
ability on the basis of strict liability in tort under section
402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (RESTATE-
MENT). " The appellate court stated that the RESTATEMENT re-
quired the plaintiffs to prove that the product was "dangerous
beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer."1' 64 The ap-
pellate court found no such proof because the plaintiffs had
"not shown that the ordinary consumer would expect a plane
made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in
1970.'' " The appellate court found in favor of the defendant
manufacturer on the basis of the state-of-the-art defense. 66
Bruce is significant in two respects. First, the case indicated
the willingness of the courts to at least consider the
crashworthiness doctrine in the field of commercial aviation
litigation. While in this particular case, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs had insufficient proof of a design defect, it
may be inferred that the ordinary consumer in 1970 expected
greater safety features of an aircraft manufactured in 1970.6'
Second, the court of appeals' emphasis on the principles of
strict liability in establishing the manufacturer's responsibil-
ity to passengers is indicative of the development of the
crashworthiness doctrine beyond the realm of negligence and
breach of warranty theories.
1" 418 F. Supp. at 836. The trial court also granted Ozark Airlines' motion for
summary judgement. Id. at 845.
Id. at 836.
544 F.2d at 442.




147 Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 65, at 559-60.
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4. The Aircraft Crashworthiness Doctrine Matures: Strict
Liability in Tort
The present progress in applying strict liability principles in
the field of aircraft crashworthiness has lagged far behind the
development of the doctrine of crashworthiness in the
automobile field. Although manufacturers have been found li-
able under the theory of strict liability in many aviation cases
since the 1960's, " the theory of strict liability was not ex-
tended significantly to problems of aircraft crashworthiness
until the 1978 landmark decision of McGee v. Cessna Aircraft
Co.'"69 Although on remand the trial court ultimately entered
judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturer, the court of
appeals did accept the principles of strict liability in aviation
crashworthiness circumstances.
In McGee a general aviation airplane crashed shortly after
take-off.1 70 On impact, the plaintiff, a passenger, suffered no
serious injuries. The plaintiff, however, was rendered uncon-
scious as a result of the crash, and was dragged from the
burning wreckage by fellow occupants.17 1 The plaintiff's legs
were amputated because of the extensive third degree burns
experienced in the post-crash fire.'17
The plaintiff sued the aircraft manufacturer on the basis of
both negligence and strict liability principles.1 73 The plaintiff
urged that her injuries were the result of design defects in the
fuel system, such that the plane was inherently unsafe.' 74 The
plaintiff contended that the fuel system was designed defec-
tively because the fuel reservoir tank was constructed and was
located in such a manner that the tank was highly susceptible
to being ruptured on crash impact by a collapsing nosewheel
strut. As a result of the rupture, the plaintiff claimed that the
'" See S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, 2 AVIATION TORT LAW 515 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Speiser],
"1 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978) discussed infra at note 177 and
accompanying text.
'1O 82 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
171 Id.
17z Id.
'8 Id. at 1007, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
114 Id. at 1007-08, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
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fuel was likely to leak into the cabin thereby creating a post-
crash hazard.175 Citing the 1972 California Supreme Court de-
cision of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.1 76 as extending strict
liability principles to design defects generally and deficient
crashworthiness problems specifically, the McGee court
opened the floodgates, permitting aviation crashworthiness
suits to be brought under strict liability principles. 7
a. The roots, policy justification, and requirements of
strict liqbility
The origins of the strict products liability theory lie in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.17 8 In this case, Jus-
tice Traynor announced the "Greenman rule": "A manufac-
turer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market .. .proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being. 17 9 Subsequently, the strict products liability
theory was incorporated in the RESTATEMENT in section 402A
which imposes strict liability on a seller of an "unreasonably
dangerous" defective product that causes harm to the user or
consumer. 80 Furthermore, the strict liability theory was made
clearly applicable to airplanes.181
Il Id. The particular Cessna aircraft involved in the crash had a non-retractable
nosewheel attached to the aircraft by a metal strut. This supporting strut was con-
nected in such proximity to the accumulator tank that on impact the strut ruptured
the accumulator tank and a fire started.
76 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
,77 McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1012, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694,
698 (1978).
170 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
17 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
ISO RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), which provides:
(1) One who sells any product in defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
161 Id.
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Although the theory of strict products liability has not been
legislatively enacted in any American jurisdiction, an over-
whelming majority of states have judicially adopted either
section 402A of the RESTATEMENT or its equivalent. 182 The
public policy rationales invoked by the courts to justify the
application of strict products liability principles are numer-
ous. First and foremost, the strict liability theory is seen as an
effective method of spreading losses caused by accidents. The
theory insures that "the cost of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.' 18 Second, the strict
liability theory serves as an economic incentive for manufac-
turers to design and to manufacture safer products because
the manufacturer's potential liability is much greater under
strict products liability principles than under negligence prin-
ciples.18 4 Thus, the strict liability theory relieves the injured
plaintiff of the problems of proof characteristic of the war-
ranty and negligence theories because the manufacturer may
be held strictly liable even if the manufacturer took reasona-
ble care in the manufacture and the design of the product."'
The plaintiff must prove the following five essential ele-
ments to succeed on the strict products liability theory: (1)
the defendant owed a strict duty to the plaintiff to provide a
product free from "defect;" (2) the defendant breached his
"' Several courts adopted strict products liability principles in aviation accident
cases. One of the first aviation accident cases in which strict liability principles were
applied was Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). See SPEISER, supra note 168, at 516-17 for citations to a
number of aviation cases recognizing the strict liability theory including: Lindsay v.
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 485 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1973); Cousins v. Instru-
ment Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978); Berkebile
v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
"s Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
", See Hoenig, Product Design and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Ap-
proach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 109, 131 (1976). Some commentators, however, have dis-
puted the view that strict liability actually encourages greater care than negligence
liability. See, e.g., Keeton I, supra note 15, at 34.
"s See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893, 898-99
(1975). See also Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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duty by providing a defective product; (3) in terms of cause-
in-fact, the defect existed when it left the control of defendant
manufacturer and was a substantial factor in causing the
plaintiff's damages; (4) the defect was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's damages; and (5) the plaintiff suffered dam-
ages. 86 This paper focuses on the first two elements of the
strict products liability cause of action. In regard to these ele-
ments, the primary concern of the courts and the commenta-
tors is the definition of "defect."
b. The development of strict liability: The meaning of
"defect"
Strict products liability is not absolute liability. The re-
quirement of a "defect" imposed by both the Greenman rule
and the RESTATEMENT, distinguishes the theories of strict lia-
bility and absolute liability.1 87 The absolute liability theory
renders a manufacturer automatically liable for all injuries in-
volved in the use of his product, regardless of whether a de-
fect is present. In contrast, the existing strict products liabil-
ity theory imposes liability upon a manufacturer short of
absolute liability but beyond negligence by requiring the
plaintiff to prove the existence of a "defect" in the product."8 8
Courts and commentators have sought to achieve, in the
hope of developing a coherent strict liability theory, a uniform
and single definition and test of "defect." The courts, how-
ever, have failed to achieve this goal. The roots of the di-
lemma can be traced back to the Greenman decision in which
I" A number of different authors and cases state these various requirements in
different ways. See, e.g., Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d
893 (1975). Each requirement is characterized by a number of problem areas. While
courts and commentators agree that in strict liability compensatory damages are re-
coverable for personal injuries, the courts are divided as to whether punitive damages
are recoverable. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for De-
sign and Punitive Damages-The Insurance Policy and Public Policy, 40 J. AIR L. &
COM. 595 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Haskell]. See also Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1268-71 (1976).
187 Comment, Strict Products Liability, supra note 17, at 210.
" See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978). See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133,
501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
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the court failed to provide any test to determine whether a
particular product is actually defective. Furthermore, section
402A of the RESTATEMENT merely muddled the definitional
problem by adding the "unreasonably dangerous" require-
ment for defectiveness. 189
The problem of defining "defect" is complicated by the
broad scope of the term in that the term encompasses both
manufacturing and design defects. In one instance, the defini-
tion and the determination of a manufacturing "defect" is a
relatively simple matter because the court may use the
"deviation-from-the-norm" test: the product is compared to
the manufacturer's own production standards. 90 In another
instance, however, the definition and the determination of a
design "defect" may be a confused and complicated process,
depending upon whether the defect is the result of an inad-
vertent design choice or a conscious design choice.'
An inadvertent design choice involves the manufacturer's
design engineer unintentionally overlooking some safety con-
sideration. As a result, the particular design chosen does not
accomplish what the design would have accomplished had the
engineer considered the safety issue.' 92 Defects arising from
such inadvertent design choices are determined in the same
relatively easy and objective manner as those defects which
involve manufacturing flaws. The simple "deviation-from-the-
norm" test may be applied. Thus, strict liability for inadver-
tent design choice also represents liability for deviation from
the manufacturer's own standards. it is assumed that had
"the risks of the inadvertent design choice been made clear to
the manufacturer, a different design would have been chosen
or warning provided."' 93 The conscious design choice involves
See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAN. L. REV. 593, 597-99 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Birnbaum I].
'10 See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liabil-
ity, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965).
"' See Henderson, supra note 16, at 1552.
Walkowiak, Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods:
'Reasonableness' Revisited? 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 705, 719 (1979) [hereineafter cited as
Walkowiak].
"'3 Id. at 722. See Henderson, supra note 16, at 1548.
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the manufacturer's design engineer being aware of and ac-
cepting certain risks associated with the intended design of
the product in exchange for the increased benefits or the re-
duced costs which the design engineer believes justify the con-
scious acceptance of those risks.1 94
Thus, strict liability is imposed on the manufacturer for dif-
ferent purposes. In the case of manufacturing flaws or inad-
vertent design choices, strict products liability is imposed to
penalize an ineffective attempt by the manufacturer to
achieve an intended objective. 195 In the case of conscious de-
sign choices, strict products liability is imposed to penalize
the manufacturer's choice of design such that a "social choice"
is substituted for the design engineer's choice.19' The formula-
tion of a social choice is a difficult and subjective task depend-
ing upon a particular court's preference to protect the con-
sumer's or the user's interest or to protect the manufacturer's
interest. 197 The complex variety of social choice trade-offs as-
sumed by different courts9 9 has resulted in a maze of defini-
tions and tests being developed to determine what constitutes
a "defective" product in conscious design defect cases. 99 Due
to the belief that the deficiency of crashworthiness in an avia-
tion product is generally the result of a conscious design
194 Henderson, supra note 16, at 1548.
'" See Walkowiak, supra note 192, at 721.
Id. at 722.
197 See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 600-01. The definition and test formulated
depends upon the particular trade-off the court has made between the consumer's or
user's interest in receiving compensation for accident-incurred losses without suffer-
ing the heavy evidentiary burdens of warranty and negligence actions and the manu-
facturer's interest in not being absolutely liable for all injuries sustained from the use
of its products. Id. at 600-01.
198 This confusion and complexity of definitions and tests has reinforced and has
been reinforced by the failure of many courts and commentators to clearly and pre-
cisely delineate negligence and strict liability notions. See Birnbaum I, supra note
189, at 601. It is not surprising that while some courts, such as those in Maryland and
Nebraska, appear to only handle design defect cases under negligence principles,
other courts, such as those in California, handle such cases under both negligence and
strict liability theories. See, e.g., Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321
A.2d 737, 746 (1974); Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831, 836-37
(1974); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694
(1978).
'" See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 600-01.
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choice, the spectrum of alternative definitions and tests devel-
oped to determine whether a product is defective due to a
conscious design choice will be examined.
(1). The "consumer expectations" test
The "consumer expectations" test, set out in section 402A
of the RESTATEMENT, provides that a product is considered
"unreasonably dangerous" when it is "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge com-
mon to the community as to its characteristics. ' 20 0 The princi-
pal advantage of the "consumer expectations" test is that the
test begins to focus the jury's attention toward the product
itself and away from the manufacturer's conduct.2 01 This shift
in focus has eased the application of the strict liability theory
as compared to the negligence theory.
The " consumer expectations" test has been criticized for
being too vague, imprecise, and subjective.202 Moreover, five
specific limitations to the test exist. First, the test tends to
short-circuit the analytical process,0s insofar as once a court
determines what an ordinary consumer's expectations are, the
case is disposed of in a routine manner without the court con-
sidering the risk and utility factors that were involved with
the design. 20 "  The "consumer expectations" test may
prejudice consumers or users205 and reward callous manufac-
turers when a danger or a risk ii patent and apparent to the
ordinary consumer. 206 If the court is of the opinion that the
risk is patent and apparent, then the court may consider the
risk to be within the reasonable contemplation of the ordinary
:00 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Section 402A, comment i (1965).
01 Birnbaum, A Re-Evaluation of the Concept of Design Defects in Products,
FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q., Winter 1978, at 199, 200 [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum II]
o Id.
',o Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Prod-
uct Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 309 (1977).
:" See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 613.
05 Id.
'" See Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443, 449 (1972). See also Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 576 P.2d 725, 730-31 (Mont.
1978).
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consumer. As a result, the court may find that the product is
not unreasonably dangerous and therefore not defective.
Thus, the deterrent effect of strict products liability is weak-
ened insofar as this test gives manufacturers little incentive to
remedy certain patent deficiencies.2 7 For example, a manu-
facturer might refuse to remedy an inadequate restraint sys-
tem or a noncrashworthy fuel system in aircraft, thinking a
court might find the aircraft so unreasonably dangerous that
the danger would be within the contemplation of the
consumer.
Second, although the "consumer expectations" test is good
for cases involving commercial losses, the test is inadequate in
personal injury and in death circumstances"' s of aircraft
crashes. Third, it is questionable whether an objective test
may be formulated or an existing test may be consistently and
objectively applied from court to court. Each court and each
jury are likely to have a different interpretation of what a rea-
sonable consumer would expect.2 9
Fourth, although purchasers and crew members of aircraft
may have sufficient expertise to develop reasonable expecta-
tions, the "consumer expectations" test is prejudicial to air-
craft passengers injured in a crash. Passengers are neither
consumers nor users and therefore lack sophisticated knowl-
edge about the product. 10 Furthermore, courts subjectively
speculate and assume that purchasers and passengers have
definite expectations respecting the dangerousness of the
product. For technologically complicated products such as air-
craft, however, purchasers and passengers may not know how
safely the product could or should have been made .2  Fifth,
certain consumer expectations of a product may be excessively
low in that the expectations are below the minimum stan-
207 Abramson, supra note 15, at 179.
200 Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic
Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 589 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Keeton III].
See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 614.
" Abramson, supra note 15, at 179.
"' See Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Keeton, Prod-
ucts Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CuM. L. REV. 293,
303-05 (1979).
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dards established by federal regulations.2 12 Thus, while strict
adherence to the "consumer expectations" test might result in
a finding of a non-defective product, the manufacturer of the
product actually may have violated FARs and therefore be
deemed negligent "per se."213 Significantly, other consumer
expectations of a product, however, may be excessively high,
surpassing the technological and/or financial abilities of the
manufacturer. 4
The "consumer expectations" test has been approved by
many commentators and courts. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., held that to
establish strict liability under section 402A of the RESTATE-
MENT the plaintiff must prove the defectiveness of the product
according to the "consumer expectations" test." 5 The court
was of the opinion that the state-of-the-art at the time of the
manufacture of the aircraft would help to determine the ex-
pectations of the ordinary consumer.2 6 In Bruce, the court
ruled in favor of the defendant manufacturer, stating that the
plaintiffs had "not shown that the ordinary consumer would
expect a plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of one
made in 1970. ' 217
(2). The "risk-utility" balancing test
A second test for deciding whether the design of a product
is "unreasonably dangerous" and thus defective is the "risk-
utility" balancing test (risk-utility test). This test has three
principal approaches. These approaches are the "reasonably
prudent manufacturer" approach, the "consumer expecta-
tions" approach, and the strict "risk-utility" approach.
", The FARs are an example of minimum federal standards respecting aircraft
crashworthiness. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of
FARs.
"I Abramson, supra note 15, at 179.
224 Id.





(a). The "reasonably prudent manufacturer" approach
Deans Wade 218 and Keeton21' first proposed, and some
courts subsequently have adopted and modified, a "risk-util-
ity" test. This test asks whether a "reasonably prudent manu-
facturer" with imputable prior knowledge of the unsafe condi-
tion of the product, would have sold the product after
considering its risks and its utility.2 20 The application of the
"risk-utility" test involves two steps. The first step distin-
guishes the strict products liability standard from the negli-
gence standard by making an assumption of constructive
knowledge: the "scienter" of the dangerous condition of the
product is imputed to the manufacturer. The "scienter" may
be imputed to the manufacturer at the time of manufacture,
at the time the product is sold,22 or at the time of trial.222
The second step of the test is the determination of whether
the product is considered "unreasonably dangerous." Courts
compare the magnitude of the "risk" created by the scientifi-
cally perceived dangerous condition of the product with the
"utility" of the product. If a reasonable person would con-
clude that the "risk" 2 3 in using the product outweighs its
"utility", the product is deemed "unreasonably dangerous"
and therefore defective.2 2' In line with this reasoning, a num-
ber of factors must be considered to determine whether the
product is "unreasonably dangerous." Dean Wade suggested
the following seven factors:
1. The usefulness and the desirability of the product-its
ate Dean Wade and Dean Keeton have propounded different forms of the "risk-
utility" test in a number of published commentaries over the last three decades.
Many other commentators and some courts have attempted to fine tune or discredit
the suggested tests. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-40 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade I].; Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufactures, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15-17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wade II.
,'9 See Keeton I, supra note 15, at 36-38.
20 See Wade II, supra note 218, at 15.
221 Dean Wade made this assumption in his test. Wade I, supra note 218, at 837-
40.
"' Dean Keeton made this assumption in his test. See Keeton II, supra note 15, at
568. See infra note 234.
"' Dean Keeton uses the terms "danger-in-fact" and "risk" synonymously.
, Keeton III, supra note 208, at 592.
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utility to the user and to the public as a whole;
2. The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that the
product will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the
injury;
3. The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be unsafe;
4. The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe charac-
ter of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it
too expensive to maintain the utility of the product;
5. The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product;
6. The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability because of general public
knowledge, the obvious conditions of the product, or of the ex-
istence of suitable warnings or instructions;
7. The feasibility on the part of the manufacturer of spread-
ing the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying lia-
bility insurance.2 2
The "reasonably prudent manufacturer" approach contains
certain theoretical advantages. First, the test encourages a rel-
atively scientific and objective examination of the design of
the product by focusing the court's attention toward the prod-
uct itself in the context of certain given criteria.2 6 Second, the
plaintiff's burden is eased through the presumption of the
manufacturer's "scienter" of the unsafe condition of the
product.22
7
Several limitations, however, exist to this approach. First,
although the difference between negligence and strict prod-
ucts liability is slight when a manufacturer such as a producer
of aircraft is the defendant, a significant difference exists as to
the standards when intermediary wholesalers and retailers are
involved as defendants.2 " Second, the presumption of the
manufacturer's "scienter" may be perceived as inequitable by
225 Wade I, supra note 218, at 837-38. See Keeton I supra note 15, at 37-38. Differ-
ent schemes of criteria have been proposed by other commentators. See e.g., Fischer,
Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 359 (1974).
:26 Keeton III, supra note 208, at 593. Keeton I, supra note 15, at 31.
",7 Keeton I, supra note 15, at 31.
18 Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46
U. CIN. L. REV. 101, 103 (1977).
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manufacturers. Manufacturers may consider that too much of
the costs of accidents are being imposed upon them.2 2 ' In
practice, however, plaintiff-victims of aircraft crashes may
perceive their burden in strict products liability actions to be
the same burden plaintiffs have in negligence actions. The vic-
tims who sue under the strict products liability theory still
lack the sophisticated knowledge that manufacturers possess
to prove such things as the technical and the economic feasi-
bility of making a safer design.23 Third, the public policy ob-
jective of strict products liability, to give manufacturers the
economic incentive to design and to manufacture improved
and safer products, is jeopardized by the "reasonably prudent
manufacturer" approach. When this approach is applied to an
aircraft manufacturer, a risk exists that the manufacturer's
superior knowledge will reduce the likelihood of it being
found liable. 31
On a judicial level, the "reasonably prudent manufacturer"
approach of the "risk utility" test was applied by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Cepada v. Cumberland Engineering
Co.232 and in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.1 33
These cases are further authority for hindsight balancing of
the "risk-utility" criteria, with the manufacturer's prior
knowledge of the risk being imputed to the manufacturer at
the time of trial3 4 rather than at the time of manufacture or
219 Keeton I, supra note 15, at 31.
2 Wade I, supra note 218, at 826.
2" Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture,
52 TEX. L. REv. 81, 93 (1973).
232 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). In Cepada, the plaintiff was injured while
operating a pelletizing machine from which a bolted safety guard had been removed.
The plaintiff alleged that the machine was defective because it was designed without
a safety device such as an electronic interlock which would have automatically
stopped the machine if the guard was not in place.
,33 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). In Suter, the plaintiff was injured when his
hand was caught in the cylinders of a sheet-metal rolling machine. The plaintiff al-
leged that a design defect occurred because the manufacturer had failed to install a
rotary guard around the court lever.
234 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. at 171-72, 406 A.2d at
150-51; Cepada v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825. This ap-
proach is derived from Dean Keeton's formulation of the test that scienter is imputed
to the manufacturer "at the time of trial." See Keeton II, supra note 15, at 568.
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sale.2 35 This expansion of the manufacturer's liability in the
direction of absolute liability has destroyed any possible state-
of-the-art defense. Manufacturers may be held liable for the
dangerous propensities of a product that were scientifically
unknowable at the time the product was manufactured and
sold2 6 but which propensities were subsequently discovered
through additional research and development. Such a hind-
sight approach when applied to aircraft accident litigation
may be onerous on aircraft manufacturers whose industry is
so rapidly changing that risks of harm previously unknown
are continually being discovered through advanced
technology.
The 1978 Oregon Supreme Court decision of Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp.,3 7 not only reiterated the Wade/Keeton
"risk-utility" approach 2 -s but also refined the "reasonably
prudent manufacturer" approach to protect the manufacturer
from absolute liability without destroying the potential of
strict products liability. The court provided that in cases in
which the risk was unknowable at the time of the manufac-
ture of the product, manufacturers would only be held strictly
liable if a possible alternative design was not only technologi-
cally "feasible" but was also technologically and economically
"practicable at the time of manufacture. 23' 9 The Wilson court
did not remedy the problem that particularly plagues aviation
accident plaintiffs, the problem of lacking knowledge respect-
ing technological and economic factors affecting product
design.
(b) The consumer expectations approach
Some courts have developed a "consumer expectations" ap-
235 Dean Wade formulated his "risk-utility" test such that scienter is imputed to
the manufacturer at the time the manufacturer placed the product into the stream of
commerce. See Wade I, supra note 218, at 839-40.
:36 Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 622, 627.
" 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, reh'g denied, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978). See
supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wilson.
:30 282 Or. at 63, 577 P.2d at 1325.
39 282 Or. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327.
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proach with a "risk-utility" basis.2 40 This approach incorpo-
rates both of these apparently distinct standards into a single
test,24 1 thereby creating much confusion and error in the ap-
plication of the "consumer expectations" approach. In order
to determine if a product is dangerous beyond the ordinary
consumer's expectations, the court must first determine what
the hypothetical ordinary consumer would reasonably contem-
plate.24 Unlike the straight "consumer expectations" test that
is based upon some vague notion of what the ordinary con-
sumer expects,2 43 the "consumer expectations" approach to
the "risk utility" test provides the court with specific "risk
utility" factors to consider such as the cost and the feasibility
of minimizing or eliminating the risk." The "risk utility" fac-
tors are to be weighed in determining what an ordinary con-
sumer would reasonably contemplate. Because jurors do not
need the ordinary consumer notion to weigh the various fac-
tors, 45 it is probably preferable to invoke a straightforward
"risk utility" test unencumbered with the difficulties of this
''consumer expectations" approach.
(c). The strict "risk-utility" approach
The Texas Surpeme Court in the 1979 automobile
crashworthiness case of Turner v. General Motors Corp.,2 46
developed a new standard for "unreasonably dangerous." The
court proposed a strict "risk-utility" test that redirects the
jury's focus from an examination of the "reasonably prudent
manufacturer's" conduct and/or the ordinary "consumer's ex-
210 See Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Estate of
Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978); Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
241 The single standard approach is to be contrasted to the dual standard approach
adopted in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978). The Barker court proposed a test based on two standards: (1) a form of the
"consumer expectations" standard and (2) a form of the "risk-utility" analysis. See
infra text accompanying notes 256-85 for further discussion of this approach.
:1 Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d at 779.
13 See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 615.
'4 Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d at 779.
15 See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 617.
246 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
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pectations" to an examination of the product itself.2 47 This
approach is beneficial insofar as it minimizes the possibility of
introducing negligence considerations. The strict "risk utility"
approach is, however, a two edged sword for the manufac-
turer. If the actual risks associated with the product outweigh
its utility, the product will be considered unreasonably dan-
gerous despite the manufacturer's diligence or good faith. If
the utility of the product outweighs the risks associated with
its use, the product will not be "unreasonably dangerous"
even though the manufacturer knew of the risks.2 8
The Turner test involves the jury making its "risk-utility"
analysis on the basis of relevant factors introduced by the liti-
gants through their presentation of evidence, rather than by a
jury instruction enumerating specific guidelines.2 4' A danger
of the strict "risk-utility" approach is that the court is pri-
marily allowing the jury to rely on some visceral sense of
whether the product involved more risk than utility. For ex-
ample, in cases involving products with which the jury has
had little experience such as cases involving aircraft and com-
ponent parts of aircraft, the presence of a seriously injured
plaintiff in the courtroom might cause the jury to discriminate
against the manufacturer. Thus, the jury might consider the
product too risky even though the manufacturer might have
adequately designed the product with every safety feature
technologically possible.250
"" Note, Products Liability: Turner v. General Motors Corp., 45 J. AIR L. & CoM.
774, 787-88 (1980). In Turner, 584 S.W.2d at 850, the court specifically rejected the
bifurcated test proposed in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.
1977) and Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
248 Note, Turner v. General Motors Corp., 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 375, 386 (1979).
219 584 S.W.2d at 849. See Note, Strict Liability and the Demise of the "Hender-
son" Bifurcated Test in Design Defect Cases-"Turner v. General Motors Corp.", 11
TEx. TECH L. REv. 953, 969-70 (1980). The Turner court outlined the following sim-
ple model instruction for the jury:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the
[product] in question was manufactured by [the manufacturer] the
[product] was defectively designed? By the term "defectively
designed" as used in this issue is meant a product that is unreasonably
dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the
product and the risk involved in its use.
584 S.W.2d at 847 n.1.
260 Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 634.
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(3). The elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement: the Cronin approach
The third broad approach to defining "defect" in conscious
design defect cases abandons the requirement of section 402A
of the RESTATEMENT, that the plaintiff prove that the defect in
the product is "unreasonably dangerous." The Cronin ap-
proach was introduced in the 1972 California Supreme Court
decision of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.2 1 In the court's view,
the RESTATEMENT deviated from the strict products liability
principles of Greenman by requiring the plaintiff to prove not
only the necessary element of a "defect" in the product but
also by requiring the plaintiff to prove the unnecessary ele-
ment of an "unreasonably dangerous" product. 52
The Cronin approach has been affirmed in subsequent Cali-
fornia court decisions including the previously discussed air-
craft crashworthiness case of McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 263
and by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court." Even though the
Cronin approach benefits the plaintiff by making it easier to
render the manufacturer strictly liable, many courts and com-
mentators criticize the approach for failing to substitute an-
other concept for the "unreasonably dangerous" concept.
Many courts and commentators believe that the term "defect"
should be given a substantive definition. Without a substan-
tive definition, jury decisions may be based on whim due to
the lack of certain guidelines.2 55
The ambiguity and confusion created for courts that
adopted the Cronin approach necessitated the development of
more precise tests to clarify the meaning of "defect." Two of
the tests developed are the Barker approach and the Az-
zarello approach.
"' 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
,' Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
25 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1017, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 701 (1978). See supra notes 169-
77 and accompanying text.
'
T
4See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
21 See Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 Van L.
Rev. 551, 557 (1980).
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(a). The "Barker" approach
The California Supreme Court tried to clarify the meaning
of "defect," within the context of Cronin, in its 1978 decision
of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.2 5 The court proposed a test
based on two standards, a form of the "consumer expecta-
tions" standard and a form of the "risk-utility" analysis. Ac-
cordingly, a product may be found defective if the plaintiff
proves the following: (1) the product "failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner;""" (2) "the prod-
uct's design proximately caused injury"; 58 and (3) "the defen-
dant fail[ed] to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on
balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh[ed] the
risk of danger inherent in such design. 2 59 Some of the rele-
vant factors that a jury might consider in using the second
standard were specifically mentioned by the court, included
the following:
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasi-
bility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an im-
proved design, and the adverse consequences to the product
and to the consumer that would result from an alternative
design.260
Although an argument can be made that the Barker court
established the "consumer expectations" standard and the
"risk-utility" standard as two independent alternative tests
for determining design defects,2 ' it is more likely that the
court intended the two standards as two separate prongs of a
single test. This latter view is supported by both the language
of the Barker decision and the policies set forth in past Cali-
'" 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
Id. at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal Rptr. at 234.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
:40 Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
11 See the discussion of this viewpoint in Comment, Strict Products Liability,
supra note 17, at 223-24.
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fornia strict products liability decisions.2 2 A two-prong alter-
native approach as opposed to a two test approach, benefits
plaintiffs by increasing the possibility that manufacturers will
be held strictly liable. If a plaintiff fails to satisfy the "con-
sumer expectations" test, the plaintiff still can prevail if the
defendant manufacturer is unable to show that the utility of
the design outweighs its risks.2" The advantages and disad-
vantages of applying the Barker test are best understood,
however, by examining three important questions raised by
the Barker decision.
Question 1. A question exists as to whether the adoption of
the "consumer expectations" standard in the first prong of the
Barker test reintroduces the "unreasonably dangerous" re-
quirement abandoned in Cronin insofar as both the RESTATE-
MENT definition of the "unreasonably dangerous" concept and
Barker's first standard are based on the ordinary consumer's
expectations. Despite arguments to the contrary," the better
view is that Barker is consistent with Cronin and varies from
the RESTATEMENT for the following reasons. First, the court in
Barker reaffirmed its reasoning in Cronin for rejecting the
"consumer expectations" test announced in the RESTATEMENT.
The court stated that the "consumer expectations" test con-
stituted "an undue restriction on the application of strict lia-
bility principles""" by imposing too onerous a burden of proof
on the plaintiff.2 6 Second, the "consumer expectations" stan-
dard in Barker is less onerous for the plaintiff than that of the
RESTATEMENT because Barker sets only a minimum standard
that a manufacturer's product must satisfy.2 7 The less oner-
ous burden on the plaintiff partly remedies the problem of
technologically sophisticated manufacturers escaping liability
"6 See Comment, Strict Products Liability, supra note 17, at 224-25.
Levy and Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CAL. L. REv.
497, 503 (1979).
" See Walkowiak, supra note 192, at 733-34.
,65 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 425-26, 573 P.2d 443, 451, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 233 (1978).
s" Id. See Comment, Strict Products Liability, supra note 17, at 219-20.
267 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 425-26, n.7, 573 P.2d at 451, n.7, 143 Cal
Rptr. at 233, n.7.
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due to consumers' lack of knowledge and their tendency to
form excessively low expectations as to the safety features and
dangers in products.2s Third, unlike the RESTATEMENT stan-
dard in which the plaintff must prove at a minimum that the
product was "more" dangerous than the ordinary consumer
would expect, according to the Barker approach, the plaintiff
only needs to show that the ordinary consumer would expect
the product to be safer.2 9 Nevertheless, an argument can be
made that in practice it is difficult to conceive of an ordinary
consumer of air travel understanding the danger involved in
an aircraft crash.s 0
If the plaintiff discharges the initial burden of proving that
the product fails to satisfy ordinary "consumer expectations,"
the defendant will be held strictly liable for injuries resulting
from a design defect. If the plaintiff, however, fails to dis-
charge this burden, the second prong of the test comes into
operation.'" 1
Question 2. A question exists as to whether the Barker
court's innovative shifting of the burden of proof to the defen-
dant in the second prong of the approach has more conse-
quence in theory, than in practice. The second prong places
upon the plaintiff the initial burden of proving a "prima fa-
cie" case that the design of the product proximately caused
his injury. If the plaintiff discharges this burden of proof, the
burden of proof then shifts to the defendant manufacturer to
'" See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 604. See supra notes 210-14 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the disadvantages of the "consumer expectations" test.
' Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. 233.
See Comment, Strict Products Liability, supra note 17, at 219.
170 Galerstein I, supra note 14, at 199. Galerstein has proposed the following ap-
proach to remedy the problem:
The court might have more logically preserved the "unreasonably dan-
gerous" language as a measure of design defect and simply denied de-
fendant the defense of the ordinary consumer's expectations. Such an
approach would have preserved the single necessary standard for mea-
surement of a design defect and would have served to protect the un-
knowing public from its own possible underestimation of the dangers
involved.
Id.
M' Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143, 143 Cal. Rptr.
at 236.
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prove that the benefit of the design outweighed its risks.2" 2
In theory, the Barker requirement that the plaintiff make a
prima facie case almost automatically shifts the burden onto
the defendant manufacturer. Indeed, one commentator 2"3 sug-
gested that in aircraft crashworthiness cases, the plaintiff's
burden of establishing a prima facie case is effectively not an
obligation:
No aircraft crash can occur in which the injured party cannot
'prove' that had the aircraft been designed differently, injury
would not have been caused or enhanced. If the cabin col-
lapsed, the cabin could have been made stronger; if the landing
gear was crushed, the gear could have been constructed with
more energy absorption characteristics.274
In practice, however, the minimal proof the plaintiff must
provide to establish a prima facie case can be expected to vary
case by case. 7" For example, in the automobile accident case
of Korli v. Ford Motor Co.276 , despite large amounts of evi-
dence presented by the plaintiff, the California Court of Ap-
peals considered the evidence insufficient to satisfy the prima
facie requirement of Barker.
277
Furthermore, once the burden of proof is shifted to the de-
fendant, the Barker approach does not significantly change
the plaintiff's and the defendant's relative burdens of proof.
172 Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The shifting of the burden of
proof to the defendant in the second prong of the test is an attempt by the California
Supreme Court to overcome the criticism made of most "risk-utility" tests that the
tests allocate to the plaintiff the burden of proving that the risk created by the prod-
uct outweighs its social utility. The court justified this shifting of the burden with two
reasons: (1) "one of the principal purposes behind the strict product liability doctrine
is to relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent
in a negligence cause of action," and (2) design defect cases involve "technical mat-
ters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer." 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 473
P.2d at 455, 143 Cal Rptr. at 237.
27' The commentator is George Galerstein who is Chief Legal Counsel of Bell Heli-
copter Textron, Fort Worth, Texas. Mr. Galerstein has written a number of articles
on the topic of aircraft crashworthiness. See supra note 14 and infra note 316 for two
of his articles.
Galerstein I, supra note 14, at 199-200.
"' See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 609.
,74 84 Cal. App. 3d 895, 149 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978) (decertified opinion by order of
the court in advance sheets only).
'71 Id. at 905-06, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05.
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The defendant manufacturer continues to have the burden of
proving that the utility of the design outweighed its risks;278 in
turn, the plaintiff attempts to rebut this evidence. The defen-
dant manufacturer is still advantaged with superior technical
knowledge.2 79
Question 3. The third significant question evoked by the
Barker decision concerns whether the adoption of a form of
"risk-utility" analysis in the second prong of the test "rings of
negligence" by reintroducing the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement eliminated in Cronin. Some commentators argue
that Barker introduces negligence principles through the
backdoor. As a jury weighs the risks against the utility of a
product to determine whether the product is in an "unreason-
able condition,"2 80 the jury is actually focusing on the manu-
facturer's conduct rather than the product 2 8 The Barker
court, however, held that the second prong was clearly a strict
liability standard rather than a negligence standard. The
court was of the opinion that the jury's attention is directed
to the product, not to the manufacturer's conduct.2 82 The
court further stated that the "risk-utility" analysis is to be
done "upon hindsight" rather than at the time of manufac-
ture, as in the case of negligence.2 88 In the end, even though
the Barker approach only has been adopted by a few courts,
'78 See, e.g., Pherson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1978).
'=' See Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 609.
88 See Comment, Strict Products Liability, supra note 16, at 221.
281 Id. at 221. The criticism assumes that when a jury determines that the risk of
danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of this design, the
jury is basically finding that the product is in an "unreasonable condition." It has
been suggested that any difference between the terms "unreasonable condition" and
"unreasonably dangerous" is one of semantics rather than of substance. The jury in
the end is focusing on the manufacturer's conduct in determining whether the manu-
facturer exposed the consumer or user to a greater risk of danger than it should have.
See id. at 221. This approach, therefore, implicitly reintroduces negligence principles
because as Dean Prosser has suggested "[t]he almost universal use of the phrase 'due
care' to describe conduct which if not negligent, should not be permitted to obscure
the fact that the real basis of negligence is not carelessness, but behavior which
should be recognized as involving unreasonable danger to others." W. PROSSER, LAW
O TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971).
'" 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 434, 573 P.2d at 454, 456, 143 Cal Rptr. at 238, 239.
'B' Id. at 430, 434, 573 P. 2d at 454, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236, 239.
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284 and rejected by many courts,8 5 the approach provides a
novel alternative test that can be applied in aircraft
crashworthiness cases.
(b). The Azzarello approach
The 1978 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Az-
zarello v. Black Brothers Co.,286 expanded on the Cronin pre-
cedent and developed an innovative definition of "defect."
First, the Azzarello court held that the trial judge was consid-
ered to have the primary screening function of determining
through "risk-utility" analysis whether the particular claim of
defective design was legally actionable. The court was of the
opinion that only after this determination was made, should
the jury have the limited function of determining "whether
the facts of the case support the averments of the com-
plaint."' 87 The jury's determination was to be based upon the
standard that the manufacturer was the guarantor of the
safety of his products and must at least provide a product
which was safely designed for its intended use.2 88
28 The Alaska Supreme Court also adopted the Barker test. Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882, 885 (Alaska 1979).
I" The Barker test was specifically rejected in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282
Or. 61, 66, 577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1978). A similar bifurcated test was rejected in Tur-
ner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979). Barker has generated
many comments in various legal journals. See, e.g., Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at
602-10; Schwartz, Forward: Understanding Products Liability 67 Cal. L. Rev. 435,
438-39 (1979); Comment, Strict Products Liability supra note 16, at 215-62.
:" 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
187 391 A.2d at 1026.
2" Id. The Azzarello court recommended that a jury should apply, a test which
involved possibly finding a product defective when the product left the manufac-
turer's control "lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or
possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use." Id. at 1027. The
Azzare~lo court stated that a judge utilizing this test would adequately charge the
jury as follows:
The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The product
must, therefore, be provided with every element necessary to make it
safe for [its intended] use, and without any condition that makes it
unsafe for [its intended] use. If you find that the product, at the time
it left the defendant's control, lacked any element necessary to make it
safe for [its intended] use or contained any condition that made it un-
safe for [its intended] use, then the product was defective, and the
defendant is liable for all harm caused by such defect.
Id. at 1026 n.12.
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An important advantage of the Azzarello approach is its
emphasis on the trial judge's screening role in assuring that
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. One can criti-
cize the approach, however, for understating the competence
of a properly instructed jury to perform "risk-utility" analy-
sis.28' Furthermore, the test that the jury is to apply, that the
manufacturer provide a product which is designed safe for its
intended use, is excessively onerous on manufacturers because
the test virtually insists that designers of the products include
every precaution and safety device possible, irrespective of
technical feasibility and prohibitive costs.2 9 The Azzarello
approach would be particularly unjust and unworkable in
cases of complicated aircraft design in which certain back-up
safety devices may involve exorbitant technical trade-offs and
financial costs.
5. The Return to the Negligence Standard; The Proposed
Statutory Alternative of the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act
Another approach to defining "defect" in conscious design
defect cases was proposed by the Model Uniform Product Lia-
bility Act (UPLA).s91 The drafters of the UPLA were con-
cerned with remedying certain key problems. These problems
included the dissatisfaction of manufacturers with the in-
creased insurance rates and the decreased availability of prod-
uct liability insurance. The drafters also were concerned with
the uncertainties in the tort-litigation system created by the
product liability rules continually changing in the courts of
"* A small minority of scholars agree with the Azzarello court's lack of confidence
in a jury's intellectual capacity to perform such a function. See, e.g., Henderson, Re-
newed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preserva-
tion of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 773, 779-80 (1979). Most commen-
tators and courts would disagree with Azzarello, having confidence in the ability of a
properly instructed jury. Bowman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa.
1977). See, e.g. Birnbaum I, supra note 189, at 637, 639.
'" Henderson, Products Liability, 2 Corp. L. Rev. 246, 248. (1979).
2" MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, § § 100-22, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as UPLA]. The UPLA was originally issued by the United States
Department of Commerce on October 31, 1979.
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various jurisdictions.2 92 Thus, the UPLA provides a uniform
and single cause of action to help stabilize insurance rates not
only by insuring that the injured plaintiff received reasonable
compensation for his injuries,2 93 but also by reducing the
plaintiff's protection.2 4
The UPLA provides that a product may be proven defec-
tive only if the product was "unreasonably unsafe" either (i)
in terms of construction or breach of express warranty as
judged by a strict liability standard or (ii) in terms of its de-
sign or in terms of inadequate warnings as evaluated by a neg-
ligence or fault standard.2 95 Specifically, the determination of
whether a product is "unreasonably unsafe" in design involves
a two-step process. First, the plaintiff must "show that his in-
jury was proximately caused by the defective design of the
product." 29 Second, the jury must determine whether a de-
fective design exists on the basis of a negligence type of "risk-
utility" analysis.2 97 Accordingly, the jury will weigh the follow-
ing two factors: (1) the likelihood that the product caused the
plaintiff's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those
harms; and (2) the manufacturer's burden of producing a
product with an alternative design that would have prevented
those harms, and any adverse effect that an alternative design
might have had on the usefulness of the product.298 These two
292 Ribstein, The Model Uniform Product Liability Act: Pinning Down Products
Law, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 349, 351 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Ribstein]. See 44 Fed
Reg. 62,714 (1979).
293 Jobe, The Model Uniform Product Liability Act-Basic Standards of Respon-
sibility for Manufacturers, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 389 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Jobe].
'9' Ribstein, supra note 292, at 351.
195 UPLA §104,44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979).
'" Jobe, supra note 293, at 40-05.
297 Id. at 405.
298 UPLA § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723. The UPLA provides specific examples
of probative evidence that the jury may consider in evaluating whether a product is
unreasonably unsafe in design. This evidence includes the following:
(a) Any warnings and instructions provided with the product; (b) The
technological and practical feasibility of a product designed and manu-
factured so as to have prevented claimant's harm while substantially
serving the likely user's expected need; (c) The effect of any proposed
alternative design on the usefulness of the product; (d) The compara-
tive costs of producing, distributing, selling, using, and maintaining
the product as designed and as alternatively designed; and (e) The
1983]
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factors should be viewed as of the time of manufacture, not as
of the time of trial.29 9
An important consequence of the UPLA approach is the
abandonment of strict products liability principles developed
at common law. Instead, the UPLA mandates returning to the
negligence standard which places on the plaintiff the entire
burden of proving that the risks at the time of manufacture
outweighed the utility of the product. This burden creates an
insurmountable obstacle in cases of technologically sophisti-
cated products like aircraft because the factors300 involved in
making this analysis are generally more within the knowledge
and the skill of the manufacturer than within the knowledge
of the injured plaintiff. 01 Another effect of the UPLA ap-
proach is the rejection of any "consumer expectations" test in
an attempt to avoid its pitfalls. 02
The UPLA has not achieved its intended uniformity and
predictability in products liability law for two reasons. First,
although the United States Congress (Congress) could enact
most effectively and economically such a law, Congress has
not done so because the UPLA drafters recognized that most
tort litigation is non-federal and intended that the UPLA be
enacted separately by state legislatures.3 03 Second, the few
states that have enacted the UPLA have tended to change its
substance significantly.30 4
new or additional harms that might have resulted if the product had
been so alternatively designed.
UPLA § 204, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979).
:" UPLA § 104(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 724 (1979).
800 See supra note 298 for a list of some of the factors to be considered.
oI See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944); Jobe, supra note 293 at 404-05.
802 UPLA § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,724.(1979).
011 Dubuc & Jones, Signigicant Legislative Developments in the Field of Aviation
Law, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 921, 921-22 (1980). The ULPA drafters intended that it be
enacted by state legislatures in the same manner in which the Uniform Commercial
Code became law in forty-nine states. Id.
304 Ribstein, supra note 292, at 350, 355. For example, Connecticut and Idaho have
used the UPLA as the basis of some legislation. See 1979 CONN. PUBL. ACT 79-483
(App. Pamph.); IDAHO CODE § 6-1401-09 (1980).
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6. The Nature of the Action
In respect to the aircraft manufacturer's tort liability, it is
clearly advantageous for the plaintiff to launch an action
based on principles of both negligence and strict liability for
four reasons. First, similar proof requirements exist for both
strict products liability and negligence actions in those juris-
dictions in which proof of an "unreasonably dangerous" prod-
uct is required before the manufacturer can be held strictly
liable for a design defect. Whatever proof of an "unreasonably
dangerous" product is required to establish that a defendant
is strictly liable, is proof usually sufficient to establish that the
defendant was also negligent.305 Second, evidence may be ad-
missible and relevant under one theory of liability and not the
other. For example, evidence of prior failures of a product
would be admissible and relevant to prove notice in a negli-
gence action but may not be relevant in a strict products lia-
bility case. 06 Third, strict liability is an advantageous basis of
action for the plaintiff insofar as intermediate suppliers of the
product who were not negligent in the design of the prod-
uct,3 0 7 can be held strictly liable in cases in which a negligent
manufacturer is insolvent, uninsured, or beyond the court's
jurisdiction. 0 8 Fourth, while contributory negligence is gener-
ally a defense in negligence actions, it is not an acceptable de-
fense to strict liability actions in many jurisdictions.30 9
C. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Judicial
Litigation of Aircraft Crashworthiness Claims
Certain advantages exist when a plaintiff sues a manufac-
turer for producing an aircraft that was not crashworthy.
First, an individual plaintiff benefits from the recovery of
damages in a personal injury and wrongful death action. Sec-
ond, the community benefits because the costs of accident-re-
101 Wade I, supra note 138, at 836-37.
11" Abramson, supra note 15, at 170.
801 Wade I, supra note 218, at 836-37 n.40.
"I Abramson, supra note 15, at 170.
309 Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. Rev. 803, 829 (1976).
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lated injuries are borne by the manufacturers, who best can
transmit the losses to consumers and users of the product.
Third, the community also benefits from safety and
crashworthiness improvements in aircraft that manufacturers
are encouraged to make and the FAA are encouraged to regu-
late after adverse judgments are entered against the
manufacturer.
The plaintiff's claim that a manufacturer is liable under the
crashworthiness doctrine also has drawbacks. First, the rela-
tively unknowledgeable court and jury are ill-prepared to di-
gest technical data and to use the data to examine the com-
plex technical and economic trade-offs which enter into an
aircraft designer's decision. This problem is emphasized be-
cause the court's attention is unrealistically concentrated on
one or two aspects of the aircraft's design when all aspects of
the design should be considered.310 Second, existing theories
of recovery generate much litigation and tremendous costs.
Litigants must hire expensive specialized lawyers and expert
witnesses"1' and the community must incur the administrative
costs of prolonged litigation.2  Third, plaintiffs often find it
difficult to prove that death or injury was proximately caused
by the defective design of the airplane.1 The defendant man-
ufacturer may assert the defense of contributory negligence as
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Furthermore,
problems exist in distinguishing deaths or injuries caused by
the initial crash impact, from injuries enhanced by deficient
crashworthiness.3 1 ' Fourth, the interest of the community in
safety is jeopardized by the adversary process. As manufactur-
ers and carriers try to shift responsibility to the other, they
may withhold important aircraft crashworthiness informa-
:,0 Galerstein, supra note 14, at 188.
81, See Kreindler, supra note 10, at 20-25.
"' Marcy, supra note 67, at 1600-01.
"' Marcy, supra note 67, at 1599. An example of this problem is an injured plain-
tiff opening an exit door, contrary to the flight attendant's instructions, when an ex-
terior fire exists.
81, Marcy, supra note 67, at 1599. This problem of proof may be complicated by
the removal of the bodies from the aircraft before the crash investigators' arrival.
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tion.3 5 One of the most important consequences of the judici-
ary's failure to develop a 'single objective definition and test
for determining design defects and uniform design standards
is that aircraft crashworthiness decisions are not predictable.
Indeed, past decisions which have decided liability generally,
do not inform the manufacturer of what is expected of its de-
signs. Therefore, the manufacturer may be unable to avoid fu-
ture liability."' 8 One commentator has illustrated the dilemma
as follows:
For example, assume a manufacturer is held liable on the ba-
sis that injuries were caused or aggravated by a seat not of suf-
ficient crashworthiness. That doesn't [sic] tell the manufac-
turer how crashworthy he ought to make the next seat, for the
circumstances of the next accident will be different and may
well be experienced under more severe conditions than the ac-
cident in question. Unless one takes the position that a seat
should be designed so that it should adequately protect the oc-
cupant under the circumstances of every possible accident, re-
gardless of severity, the manufacturer's dilemma is obvious."'
The absence of a single objective test and standard has re-
sulted in two conflicting viewpoints as to the competence of
the judicial process in the determination of defectiveness.
Some courts are of the opinion that it is acceptable that the
courts develop and apply tests and standards case-by-case, so
long as the jury is properly instructed.318 Other commentators
suggest, however, that the subjectivity of the judicial process
"' Kennedy, Accidents in Commercial Air Transpprtation-A Proposed Reform
of the Liability and Compensation System, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 247, 248 (1975).
Other alleged disadvantages of the judicial litigation of crashworthi-
ness claims include: the manufacturer is unfairly treated insofar as de-
sign defect liability involves a retrospective determination of the safety
and reasonableness of design of the product long after the original de-
sign decisions were made; and the liability for conscious design choices
is an unwarranted extension of strict liability since it does not take
into consideration that the design process requires compromises.
Haskell, supra note 186, at 601-07. For these and other disadvantages, see Marcy,
supra note 67, at 1567-1602.
3" Galerstein, Aircraft Crashworthiness: Who Sets the Standard?, 28 Fed'n Ins.
Counsel Q. 258, 258-60 (1978).
3" Id. at 259.
", Bowman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242-45 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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in determining priorities among various goals of safety, per-
formance, and cost makes it preferable for Congress and gov-
ernment administrative agencies to establish tests and design
standards. 19
V. PROPOSALS
This article has attempted to demonstrate the complex in-
termingling of technical factors and legal issues which are in-
volved in aircraft crashworthiness cases. In many ways, this
complex intermingling renders the judicial process deficient in
the determination of aircraft and parts manufacturers' tort li-
ability. In line with this reasoning, this study proposes certain
basic procedural and substantive changes.
First, Congress and the FAA should be given a greater role
and the courts in turn a lesser role in the determination of
tests, definitions, and standards respecting a manufacturer's
liability, generally, and the crashworthiness of an aircraft,
particularly. Indeed, the present process of congressional com-
mittee and subcommittee hearings32 0 in respect to aircraft
safety might be reinforced by more hearings with a broader
scope of investigation. Furthermore, recommendations result-
ing from these hearings should be more seriously acted upon
by Congress and the FAA. The FAA should more extensively
and effectively use its congressionally granted power of
promulgating various FARs. The advantages of such an ap-
proach are that the FAA and Congress's specialized commit-
tees could generally provide fairer, more objective, more ex-
pert, and less expensive hearings than the courts.
Second, Congress should enact some form of a Uniform
Products Liability Act. If Congress, as opposed to state legis-
latures, enacts a Uniform Products Liability Act a certain uni-
formity, consistency, and predictability in regard to
Henderson, supra note 16, at 1542-50, 1555-56.
000 In the past, witnesses have testified before the House Subcommittee on Avia-
tion respecting aircraft crashworthines and the subcommittee has proposed recom-
mendations to the FAA. See, e.g., Aviation Safety: Hearings on Aircraft Cabin Envi-
ronment Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Review of the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976).
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crashworthiness could be attained throughout the United
States. This statute not only should recognize the doctrine of
automobile and aircraft crashworthiness developing at com-
mon law, but should also provide a single uniform definition
and test of "defect" in conscious design choice cases, replacing
the maze of definitions and tests at common law. Thus, the
courts would assume the more limited function of applying
and interpreting a definiton and test already established by
Congress.
Third, the FAA and Congress should establish compulsory
and uniform minimum crashworthiness design standards.
These crashworthiness design standards should reasonably ac-
commodate the recommended standards of such organizations
as the Society of Automotive Engineers3 2' and the military.3 22
Furthermore, the standards should be sufficiently clear and
precise to give manufacturers adequate guidelines on crash-
worthy designs. The standards, however, should not be so
clear and precise as to impede manufacturers from accommo-
dating unforeseen design difficulties. Lastly, it is recom-
mended that an aircraft manufacturer who proves compliance
with such standards should be conclusively considered legally
to have designed a crashworthy aircraft.
The adoption of these recommendations would result in nu-
merous benefits over the existing system for the following rea-
sons. First, the FAA and the specialized committees and sub-
committes of Congress are more likely than the courts to
acquire the technical expertise necessary for understanding
the numerous and complex interrelated tradeoffs entering into
an aircraft designer's decisions. Unlike the courts which gen-
erally only focus on one or two design aspects, the FAA and
Congress can focus on the overall design of the aircraft. As a
result, aircraft manufacturers can more systematically and
consistently design their aircraft to avoid future liability.32 3
"' See generally Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., Aerospace Recommended
Practices (cited in Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 60, at 563 n. 67).
"' See U.S. ARMY, CRASH SURVIVAL DESIGN GUIDE (Tech. Report No. 71-22
1971)(cited in Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft, supra note 60, at 564 n.68).
"' Marcy, supra note 67, at 1603. Marcy develops this argument on the basis of an
analogy in the automotive field found in O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw.
U.L. REv. 299, 375 (1963).
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Second, most of the direct and indirect costs caused by the
tremendous amount of aircraft crashworthiness litigation can
be avoided. Third, minimum objective design standards are
more likely to be formulated toward public safety when man-
ufacturers, airlines, and other interested parties provide
crashworthiness information in relatively detached congres-
sional or administrative forums rather than the adversarial
environment of the courtroom. Fourth, such an approach
gives an aircraft manufacturer knowledge of more clearly de-
fined guidelines regulating his prospective design behavior.
These guidelines are more equitable than the present system
in which the courts often make decisions respecting the safety
of the design long after the manufacturers made the original
design decisions. Fifth, insofar as the courts are no longer vi-
tal to the process of formulating minimum design standards,
the criticism is avoided that liability for conscious design
choices is an unwarranted extension of strict liability.
In the short-run, it is improbable that the present Reagan
Administration will adopt such an approach given its prefer-
ence for deregulation, free-market forces, and generally less
government involvement in the economy. In the long-run,
however, if some future administration is more favorably dis-
posed to follow these recommendations, everyone will benefit
including aircraft manufacturers, airlines, crews, passengers,
and crash victims. Legislative and administrative tests and
standards will establish clearcut crashworthiness guidelines
that aircraft manufacturers will know, thereby pressuring
them to design safer aircraft. Judicial application and inter-
pretation of those standards will in supplementary fashion en-
sure that aircraft crash victims are properly compensated in
design defect cases.
